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One of the most debated areas of metaethics is whether moral beliefs should be understood as descriptive beliefs or as non-cognitive states of 
mind. If the former is true, then moral beliefs are truth-apt and should be understood to describe facts of the world. Expressivists think that 
moral beliefs are expressions of non-cognitive states of mind similar to desires and that moral beliefs do not get their meaning from any 
descriptive facts. Instead, the function of a moral judgement is to avow attitudes, express preferences, or the like. This thesis explores two 
problems, which arise from the expressivists understanding of moral beliefs. More specifically, the problems investigated are about how 
uncertainty and certainty in our moral beliefs should be understood by those endorsing expressivism. 
 
Expressivism neatly explains why moral beliefs have a motivational force, but faces problems in explaining why our everyday normative talk 
seems to behave as if moral beliefs are similar to all the descriptive beliefs we have. Quasi-realism is a project aimed to explain and justify 
everyday moral talk from the expressivist viewpoint. Moral error is one of the concepts our everyday moralizing uses, which quasi-realism aims 
to justify. Being wrong in moral matters should be possible, as should uncertainty on whether your own moral beliefs are erroneous. If moral 
beliefs are expressions of desire-like non-cognitive states of mind, it is not obvious how we can be uncertain of them. After all, desires are 
traditionally thought to be unquestionable. An explanation of moral uncertainty is, in this case, a crucial goal for quasi-realism. Andy Egan 
claims that quasi-realists cannot provide a good enough explanation of moral uncertainty. In particular, he argues that there are fundamental 
moral beliefs which quasi-realists are forced to judge as a priori true, while everyone else’s fundamental moral beliefs can be doubted. If so, 
this asymmetry means that quasi-realists are unpardonably smug and so fail to vindicate our everyday understanding of morality.  
 
Michael Smith provides another problem for quasi-realists and expressivists. He claims that moral beliefs have three features, and expressivists 
can only provide an explanation of two of them. These three features are the importance of a belief versus other beliefs, its stability when new 
facts and opinions are uncovered, and the certitude that the belief holder has regarding the truthfulness of the belief. From these three features, it 
is certitude that is widely regarded as the one which expressivists cannot explain, making quasi-realists’ goals once again unattainable.  
 
This thesis explores the different ways quasi-realists and expressivists have tried to answer these arguments and failed. I will argue that the two 
problems presented here are linked, and the solution to Egan’s argument can only be gained if Smith’s argument is also solved. Smith’s 
understanding of certitude is argued to be erroneous, and that his problem of explaining certitude poses no further problems for expressivists, 
which everyone else would not face as well. In addition, this thesis will have suggestions of how certitude should be understood regardless of 
metaethical views. As for Egan’s challenge, I will argue that his definition of fundamental moral beliefs is incomplete. I propose that 
fundamental moral belief should be understood as completely certain beliefs and that expressions of knowledge accompany those, and that no-
one can doubt fundamental beliefs. We are all smug when it comes to our most fundamental moral beliefs. 
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"Stealing is wrong" is an ethical statement. There are commonly understood to be three 
ways to form philosophical questions about this judgement, each creating a layer on top 
of the other one. The first layer is about the practical questions this statement produces 
and is called applied ethics. Applied ethics is concerned with questions of when and how 
do moral judgements apply. Is it wrong to steal from a thief in order to provide a meal for 
a needy family? If we can prevent stealing, does this create an obligation for us to do just 
that?  
 
Next layer of ethics is discussing why "stealing is wrong", called normative ethics. Is 
stealing wrong because stealing does not maximise happiness, or because it violates our 
duty to respect humanity? If applied ethics is interested in daily problems created with 
automation and machine learning used in the medical industry, normative ethics aims to 
discover general rules for declaring acts right or wrong by finding out why some things 
are wrong or right. Normative and applied ethics do mingle in some cases, as both are 
interested in actually discovering what to do in certain situations.  
 
This thesis deals with neither of these layers, but the one which discusses questions that 
come before these problems. Questions of whether anything really is wrong, what is 
"wrongness", or are moral judgements truth-apt is called metaethics. Metaethics is 
involved with the epistemology of moral knowledge, the semantics of moral talk and 
thought, metaphysics of moral properties, the psychology of moral agents, and even 
anthropology of moral disagreement between communities. Metaethics is considered to 
be completely separate from applied and normative ethics, as the questions it deals with 
are abstract. However, if metaethics fails to provide answers to what morality is or 
undermines the use of moral facts, it could be argued that applied and normative ethics 
would be in trouble as well. Applied and normative ethics are closest to our everyday 
moralising, and so almost all metaethicists want to preserve them. Even in the case that 
metaethicist would deny that there are any moral facts or that all moral claims are 
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systematically false, there is usually offered a way to preserve our surface-level 
moralising.  
 
Considering the scope of metaethics, it is no wonder that there are a lot of different 
positions one can take. One of the significant diving lines in metaethics, and central to 
this thesis, is the question of whether moral beliefs are truth-apt. Cognitivists claim that 
moral beliefs, such as "stealing is wrong", are similarly describing the world as a belief 
of "cat is on the mat". Cognitivists are usually also realists, saying that those descriptive 
facts exist in a metaphysical sense. Relying on descriptive facts would seem to be the 
most common-sensical way of understanding moral beliefs. The focus on this thesis is on 
a set of theories, which deny that moral beliefs should be understood to be equal to beliefs 
about descriptive matters. These theories are called non-cognitivist, as they state that 
moral beliefs are non-cognitive states of mind, similar to desires and emotions. An early 
form of non-cognitivism even stated that moral beliefs are just emotions, saying "stealing 
is wrong" is effectively saying "stealing boo!".   
 
The branch of non-cognitivism that is the focus of this thesis is more advanced, and more 
complicated, than just declaring moral beliefs to be emotions. Declaring moral beliefs to 
be emotions and denying that they are truth-apt means that no normative logic is possible. 
Expressivism aims to enable logical thought even though it maintains the non-cognitivist 
explanation of moral beliefs. Expressivism is commonly accompanied by quasi-realism, 
which is a project within expressivism that wants to explain and justify our everyday 
moral talk. Quasi-realists will want to earn our right to speak of true moral beliefs from 
the expressivist viewpoint. Naturally, there are many arguments back and forth whether 
they can actually do this. It is no small thing first to argue that moral judgements do not 
get their meaning from moral facts at all, indeed that moral facts do not exist in a 
metaphysically robust sense at all, and in the next sentence claim that using moral facts 
when speaking of moral matters is justified. 
 
The issue researched in this thesis is about whether quasi-realists can justify all that they 
claim to do. If moral beliefs are expressions of non-cognitive states of mind and not 
"ordinary" beliefs, how should we understand uncertainty in our moral judgements? After 
all, the prime example of a non-cognitive state of mind is a desire, and it does not make 
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any sense to doubt whether a desire we have is true or not. The existence of a desire is 
enough to be sure of it. In contrast, while I am pretty certain that "stealing is wrong" is a 
correct judgement, I am open to doubt if that is true in all possible situations. So I do have 
some uncertainty in the proposition "stealing is always wrong", and quasi-realists should 
be able to make sense of both my certainty in one judgement and uncertainty in the other. 
Even more, they should be able to make sense of why I am more confident of one 
judgement compared to some other moral judgement.   
 
Andy Egan proposed an argument that rests on the asymmetry of doubt resulting from 
the quasi-realist position. Egan argues that quasi-realism is forced to conclude that only 
way for an expressivist to doubt a moral judgement is to question whether he would keep 
that belief after an improvement in his epistemic situation, for example after a fresh 
contemplation of facts at hand or after learning new matters (Egan 2007, 206). As for 
beliefs we judge that we would not change after any improvement, Egan calls them stable 
or fundamental beliefs. Based on the last two sentences, it is clear that we cannot doubt 
these fundamental beliefs. Despite our inability to doubt our own fundamental beliefs, we 
still can doubt everyone else's fundamental beliefs. This asymmetry is, according to Egan, 
unpardonably smug and against common moral thought. If correct, this would mean that 
the quasi-realist project fails. 
 
Michael Smith, on the other hand, focuses on the non-cognitivist roots of quasi-realism. 
Smith argues that non-cognitivists cannot explain the three features of moral beliefs he 
identifies. The three features of beliefs are robustness, importance, and certitude of a 
moral belief. Desire-like non-cognitive states of mind can only account for two of the 
features with the strength of a desire and changes in that strength over time (Smith 2002, 
316). It is the certitude which comes under Smith's fire as the most challenging feature 
for non-cognitivists to explain. If Smith is right, no non-cognitivist, expressivists and 
quasi-realists included, can explain what graded levels of uncertainty are, making it 
impossible for them to compare confidence levels of two different moral beliefs. 
 
In this thesis, I will argue that Egan's and Smith's arguments should be understood to deal 
with the same issue: how quasi-realists should understand uncertainty in moral beliefs. 
More generally, I aim to shed light on how uncertainty in moral beliefs should be 
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understood by all and how quasi-realism has every tool it needs in order to answer the 
questions proposed here. Both Egan and Smith formulate problems which do not only 
plague quasi-realists, but turn out to be problems equally for everyone.  
 
First, in chapter 2, I will briefly lay out the metaethical scene in which quasi-realism 
operates. It will explain what the difference between quasi-realism and its main rivals is, 
as well as explaining the key terminology used in this thesis. The aim of chapter 2 is to 
explain why the problems explained in the later chapters look like problems only quasi-
realists face, and why the rival theories do not face demands to explain uncertainty.  
 
Chapter 3 first explains Andy Egan's challenge, shows how it has been reformulated so 
that Egan's real challenge to quasi-realism is discovered, and then lays out several 
proposals for answering that challenge. After dismissing all the proposals as inadequate, 
I will argue that understanding how credences function is the key to finding out a viable 
solution. This argument connects Egan's challenge to Smith's argument, which is then 
explained in chapter 4. Chapter 4 is devoted to Smith's challenge as well as explaining 
counterarguments to that challenge and how those fail to meet the challenge. 
 
After explaining the challenges to quasi-realism dealt with in this thesis in chapters 3 and 
4, chapter 5 will clarify what is meant by degrees of belief and certitude. The Bayesian 
model of belief, which is at the heart of Smith's account of certitude, is argued to be faulty. 
Sections 5.3 and 5.4 will explore out different possibilities of understanding certitude and 
degrees of belief while arguing that quasi-realists can use all of the credible options that 
realists can use. 
 
While chapter 5's aim is to answer Smith's challenge and explain how certitude is 
problematic not just for quasi-realists, chapter 6 will take all the previous learning 
together to argue what commitments fundamental belief really has. The aim in chapter 6 
is to answer Egan's challenge with all the learnings from previous chapters and end with 
a summary of conclusions in chapter 7. The overarching aim of this thesis is to defend 
quasi-realism against these two charges and argue that quasi-realism does not have any 
additional burden of proof compared to its biggest rivals.  
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2 COMPARISON OF REALISM AND QUASI-
REALISM 
 
2.1 What Expressivism Is Not 
 
Before exploring quasi-realism, we first need to understand its roots. The previous chapter 
gave a brief introduction to the main arguments dealt in this thesis and their background, 
but to fully understand the discussion in the latter chapters of this thesis will require more 
depth. One of the central themes in this thesis is the juxtaposition between cognitivist 
realism and expressivism, and the claim of quasi-realists that they can explain all realist-
seeming aspects of our moral thought from the expressivist starting point. To understand 
why this is a controversial issue and what exactly is the difference between realism and 
quasi-realism; this chapter will explore similarities and differences between these 
different metaethical viewpoints. As a result, the commitments of quasi-realism are laid 
bare.  
 
As with many things in life, to better understand what expressivism and quasi-realism 
are, it benefits to look into what they are not. The general debate is about how to 
understand talk and thought about moral facts, and in some cases, whether they even exist. 
The "default" theory about moral facts is called moral realism. As Geoff Sayre-McCord 
(2017) describes it, moral realism takes claims about moral matters to aim to report facts, 
and that those claims are true if the world is as those facts describe it. In other words, the 
claim that John has to follow his promises aims to report a similar fact as the claim that 
grass is green, and both claims are judged to be true or false in a similar fashion.  
 
Moreover, moral realists also make the substantive claim that at least some of those moral 
claims are true, thus rejecting error theory, which argues that all moral claims are false or 
involve a mistaken presupposition 1 (Sayre-McCord, 2017) To briefly summarise the 
discussion so far, moral realism takes moral facts to really exist in a similar way to 
ordinary, descriptive facts. The rest of this section will explore the questions moral 
realism raises and why there is room for alternative theories.  
 
1 For a more nuanced and comprehensive explanation of moral error theory, see f.e. Jonas Olson Moral 
Error Theory (2014) or John Mackies Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (1977), in which Mackie coined 
the term “Error Theory”. 
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While all moral realists claim that moral facts are metaphysically real, there is a 
disagreement of how those facts should be understood. The disagreement is about how 
moral facts relate to naturalism. Do moral facts conform to naturalistic rules, or should 
they be understood to be different from natural facts? Naturalism is a metaphysical claim 
according to which only those facts that we can reconcile with the results of (natural) 
science can be true (Sayre-McCord, 2017). Natural sciences are, for their part, understood 
to include psychology in their midst (Miller 2003, 4). For realists, this means that if 
naturalism is accepted, moral facts should be understood as being shorthand of, or 
otherwise closely related to, natural properties. There exists little consensus on what 
should be counted as natural properties, as quite often they are described as those 
properties which are investigated by natural sciences and psychology (f.e Miller 2003, 4). 
While easy to explain in principle, natural properties resist a clear definition. Ridge 
(2018a) lists a number of possible definitions ranging from the above used “investigated 
by natural sciences and psychology” to “can be known only a posteriori”. The precise 
definition of natural properties is beyond this thesis, if not all current literature, and so a 
few examples of what natural moral properties could be will suffice. For naturalist moral 
realists, moral properties would be defined as “promotes happiness”, “desirable”, 
“pleasant” and similar terms. The benefit of naturalism is that it would neatly explain the 
findings of normative ethics, almost as-is. Classic utilitarian or deontological 
explanations of what "good" is can be taken to describe facts of the world, if naturalistic 
realism is adopted. 
 
One of the earliest arguments against understanding moral facts as natural properties was 
presented by G.E. Moore presented in his 1903 volume, Principia Ethica. Moore's Open 
Question Argument, as it is known, argues that defining moral terms with natural 
properties always begs the question of whether that natural property is what the moral 
term means (Sayre-McCord, 2017). For example, defining "good" as "promoting 
happiness" can always be questioned by asking "is promoting happiness really good?", 
even by a competent speaker who understands the terms. The question of whether any 
natural property can adequately capture what moral terms means remains open and 
according to Moore, and many of his contemporaries, this proves that natural properties 




Moore's argumentation is not currently thought to be as convincing as his contemporaries 
took it, but his argument let people to question naturalistic understanding of moral facts.  
There are currently other ways to highlight that natural and moral facts are crucially 
different. As Alexander Miller (2003, 21) puts it, there appears to be a conceptual or 
internal link between a judgement that relies on moral facts and acting according to it, 
which judgements that include only natural properties do not have. If this truly is so, 
naturalists owe an explanation of what that link is. This line of argumentation rests 
heavily on whether that kind of internal link does exist, and so it is not a complete knock-
down argument against naturalism. Still, the link between moral judgements and 
motivation to act according to those judgements demands an explanation from naturalists.  
 
If Moore's argument and the argument from moral motivation are convincing, a realist 
can take another path. That is to say that moral facts are non-natural facts. Non-naturalism 
is what Moore himself subscribed to and claimed that moral facts are instantiations of the 
non-natural, simple and unanalysable property of moral goodness (Miller 2003, 29). 
Unsurprisingly, any non-naturalistic version of realism, like Moore's, has also problems. 
For one, we must first point how moral facts appear to depend on natural facts. In two 
cases where the natural facts are the same, it seems necessarily true that the moral facts 
are the same as well. The most uncontroversial example uses possible worlds to illustrate 
the case. Consider two possible worlds, which are identical in every natural fact. If a thing 
is morally wrong in one of them, it clearly must be wrong in the other one as well (Ridge, 
2018). In a more general way, moral supervenience is understood to be saying that for all 
moral wrong actions, there exists such features that anything else with those features are 
necessarily wrong as well (Väyrynen 2012, 174). Dependence of moral facts on natural 
facts, or the supervenience of moral facts upon natural facts, is a significant problem for 
all non-naturalistic versions of realism. Why would this supervenience exist, if moral 
facts are not reducible to natural properties and are distinct from them? 
 
The problem of supervenience is about the metaphysics of moral facts. Another important 
problem arises from the field of epistemology. David Hume famously stated "no ought 
from is", claiming that there is no valid inference from solely non-moral premises to a 
moral conclusion (Sayre-McCord, 2017). Hume's argument complements Moore's line of 
thought, which states that no moral fact can be discovered by just examining natural facts 
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with the scientific method. Natural sciences can establish what "is", but not what "ought 
to be". The logical next question is that where do we get moral premises, those facts and 
starting points that we can use to discover moral conclusions? Moore himself attributed 
those to intuition. In Moore's theory, intuition is similar to sense-perception but focus on 
discovering moral truths. 
 
Nevertheless, as Miller (2003, 35) puts it, it is quite obscure what intuition means in this 
context. Either it seems to refer to the capacity to make correct moral judgements, or it 
means a cognitive faculty like sense-perception, but unlike it as well as it perceives affairs 
outside of causality (Miller 2003, 35). Both options are lacking in explanative power. 
Claiming intuition is a capacity to make correct moral judgements, and thus moral 
judgements access moral facts, is a trivial claim which does not explain how intuition is 
capable of accessing those moral facts. On the other hand, claiming that intuition is like 
a sense-perception, but can access facts that cannot be detected by senses, does require 
significantly more explanation than what has thus far been offered (Miller 2003, 36). 
 
While there is an ongoing debate about how valid all these arguments against realism are, 
at least the arguments opened up a possibility to look for other solutions. In the early 20th 
century it seemed like equating moral facts with either natural properties or defining them 
as non-natural seemed to face significant obstacles, making moral realism a dead end. 
Problems that moral realism faced from Moore and his contemporaries is the backdrop 
that set the scene for expressivism to emerge and offer an alternative view, one that shifts 
the focus from what moral facts are to the human activity of making ethical judgements. 
That alternative view is examined in the next section in more detail.  
 
Before that, the key points about the realist perspective relevant to the discussion in this 
thesis can be summarised so that at the surface level, realism conforms nicely to our 
everyday moral talk and intuitions. It treats moral beliefs as similar to non-moral beliefs, 
and so does not face any extra burden to explain things that work similarly in and non-
moral cases. A quick look beneath the surface, however, undercovers significant 
problems as discussed widely in this section. Moral and non-moral beliefs behave 
differently in many ways. These differences are embraced by expressivists, as can be seen 




2.2 Expressivism Explained 
 
As we saw in the last section, realism has historically faced its most potent objections 
from metaphysical and epistemological standpoints. Those objections sparked interest in 
antirealism, which denies that moral facts or properties are real (Miller 2003, 5). This 
section will briefly explain what antirealist expressivism is and what commitments it 
makes. 
 
Essentially, expressivism is a metaethical theory according to which a normative 
judgement gets its meaning from the non-cognitive state of mind of the agent expressing 
the judgement (Toppinen 2014, 13). Recall that moral realism takes claims about moral 
matters, which are normative judgements, to aim to report facts. This difference has often 
been illustrated by how the mind of the person making a moral judgement fits the actual 
world. Moral realism takes moral judgements to aim to represent moral properties and 
that those judgements are true only if those moral properties are represented as they really 
are in the world. Trying to represent the world correctly is a so-called mind-to-world fit, 
where the aim is to change the mind to fit how the world is. For expressivists, the 
judgement “x is good” is (roughly) a desire-like state of mind that approves the x and 
aims to change the world to fit this judgement, i.e. the fit is reversed from the cognitivist 
version like realism and is world-to-mind (Schroeder 2010, 12).  
 
The function or purpose of normative judgement can thus be understood to either 
represent the world or to express an approval-like state of mind. Mark Schroeder (2010, 
73) explains the standard expressivist manoeuvre with an illustrative example. A non-
normative sentence like “grass is green”, when sincerely stated, expresses a belief that 
grass is green. Expressivists claim that a normative judgement like “murder is wrong” 
expresses a relevant attitude precisely the same way as the sentence “grass is green” 
expresses a belief (Schroeder 2010, 73). The difference between realism and expressivism 
then lies in what type of mental activity or state of mind is expressed. To make the issue 
clear, it is important to note that expressivism is not a subjectivist theory. “Murder is 
wrong” does not report that we have a non-cognitive attitude of disapproval against 
murder, it expresses the opposition to murder. Much like “grass is green” does not report 
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that we have a belief about the colour of grass, but rather expresses the belief that grass 
is green.   
 
Expressivism explains many of the problems that moral realism faced, but with the 
downside of seemingly losing connection with the so-called common moral thought. For 
example, declaring that moral judgements do not represent any facts of the world and that 
the function of a moral judgment is to change the world, not describe it, leaves open a 
question of whether moral beliefs are truth-apt at all. Having mind-independent moral 
truths, on the other hand, is considered widely as one of the cornerstones of moralizing. 
Quasi-realism is an attempt to explain this common moral thought and justify it from the 
expressivist viewpoint. Whether quasi-realism can do this in all issues is the crux of this 




As has been discussed in previous sections, there is a conflict between everyday moral 
talk and expressivism. Expressivism is an antirealist theory, which denies any moral 
reality (Blackburn 2009, 7). Denying moral facts seems to fly in the face of our intuitions, 
as we very much tend to think moral matters as true or false. While it can be the case that 
our intuitions are wrong and should be changed, that is not what most expressivists are 
aiming for.  
 
Quasi-realism aims to resolve this conflict between intuitions and expressivism by 
justifying and explaining everyday moral talk from the expressivist viewpoint (Blackburn 
1993b, 185). As such, it is an influential program within modern-day expressivism. The 
exists an unfortunate problem with justifying and explaining "everyday moral talk": it is 
not clear what is meant with that. Blackburn, the original author of quasi-realism, clarifies 
that quasi-realism aims to justify such things as speaking of moral truth that can be 
discovered and claiming that there can be wrong moral opinions (Blackburn 1984, 180).  
 
Quasi-realist will happily speak of mind-independent moral truths all the while 
acknowledging that moral beliefs are "just" expressions similar to approval and 
disapproval. How can they do this? Deflationism, or minimalism as it is also called, is the 
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tool to do that. Very roughly, minimalism is the position that truth is not a substantial 
property and that adding "is true" to a proposition is just a way to assert it (F.e. Van 
Roojen 2018, Stoljar & Damnjanovic 2014). As expressivism already has a robust 
explanation of the moral proposition like "killing is wrong", and if adding "is true" to that 
proposition adds nothing substantial, quasi-realists can continue to speak of moral truth 
by embracing minimalism. Wittgenstein, who serves as an influence on quasi-realism, 
says that speaking of truth is just making clear of the speaker's commitments on the issue 
at hand, and similarly quasi-realist will speak of moral truth without adding any extra 
burden to themselves (Blackburn 1998, 78). 
 
Expressivists have made their difference to moral realism apparent by substituting "moral 
belief" with "moral judgement" when talking about moral matters. While both phrases 
refer to the same activity, judgement is more easily understood to be a non-cognitive 
mental act. Quasi-realists might not want to do that emphasis. For a quasi-realist, moral 
judgements are beliefs, but those beliefs function differently from non-moral beliefs. 
Blackburn has even suggested that quasi-realism should be called "non-descriptive 
functionalism", to make a point about what where his commitments are (Blackburn 1998, 
77). He is drawing the line on whether moral propositions should be understood as 
representations of how the world is or whether they are best understood in other terms, 
backing the latter explanation (Blackburn 1998, 77). The difference between realism and 
quasi-realism is then about how and why we have moral beliefs and how those beliefs are 
applied, not about whether there are moral facts in the world. 
 
Intuition and uneasiness with consequences are not bullet-proof tenets of any 
philosophical thought, but it surely helps if we do not need to change everything we think 
about ethics. Expressivism and anti-realism could lead to a conclusion that we need to 
change how we talk about moral matters, even quite radically. Abandoning the idea that 
moral beliefs, like "murder is wrong", are not true or false does not sound that inviting a 
thought for most of us. Quasi-realism preserves the validity of these thoughts, which 
explains why most modern expressivists tend to subscribe to the quasi-realist project. 




To summarise, quasi-realism denies that any moral "reality" exists and speaks of moral 
truth in a minimal sense. There are only natural facts, which moral facts are not, but 
speaking of moral truth, as all our surface-level moralising, is justifiable. Quasi-realism 
is seemingly full of contradictions. Next chapter points out one of those and introduces a 
challenge to whether quasi-realists can truly claim all that they do.  
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3 FUNDAMENTAL MORAL CERTAINTY 
 
3.1 Smug Quasi-Realism 
 
Last chapter recounted how quasi-realism wants to earn the right to the everyday moral 
talk from expressivist standpoint. The possibility to doubt moral beliefs, own and others, 
is one those common ideas most of us subscribe to. Problem for quasi-realists is to explain 
how that can be done while ditching the representational content of our moral thought. If 
moral judgements are expressions of non-cognitive states similar to desires, like 
expressivism states, how can anyone doubt those? After all, we cannot doubt our desires; 
we either have a desire or do not have one, even if we are uncertain whether we want to 
act upon it. 
 
Turning back to quasi-realism, and to the project of justifying everyday moral talk for 
expressivists, the ability to doubt your own moral beliefs seems to be something quasi-
realist is required to explain. Simon Blackburn has done just that. According to 
Blackburn, doubting one’s moral judgement is to be open to a possibility that moral 
judgement might not hold in light of one’s other judgements and beliefs (Blackburn 1998, 
318). The judgement in question could have defects of information, coherence, or 
imagination, which might be revealed after introspection or by acquiring more 
information. In other words, doubting of moral beliefs is to be open to a possibility that 
after an improvement in one’s epistemic situation, that belief would be dropped. On 
Blackburn’s famous terms, to doubt your own moral judgement is to “stand on one part 
of the (Neurath) boat and inspect the others” (Blackburn 1998, 318). Blackburn’s view 
can be expressed as: 
 
QUASI-REALIST UNCERTAINTY: Being uncertain of one’s own moral belief is to be 
open to a possibility that the belief might not survive an improvement in one’s epistemic 
situation. 
 
In his influential article “Quasi-Realism and Fundamental Moral Error” (2007), Andy 
Egan denies that Blackburn succeeds to vindicate quasi-realism. Egan claims that while 
it is possible for expressivists to explain what being uncertain or certain of own moral 
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beliefs is, that explanation is not compatible with quasi-realism as that explanation 
requires dropping ordinary moral thought (Egan 2007, 206). To make his argument Egan 
presents three, contradictory claims, which he says quasi-realism is committed to. 
 
Egan's first claim is that quasi-realists are committed to not being smug. If there is a 
possibility that someone else can make a mistake in moral matters, in the sense of holding 
an incorrect belief or judgement, I cannot have any a priori certainty that I cannot make 
the same mistake (Egan 2007, 210). To claim otherwise would be smug. The first claim 
can be defined as: 
 
NO SMUGNESS: There is no a priori certainty that if you are mistaken on a moral 
matter, I cannot be mistaken as well. 
 
Denying smugness is a normative claim, saying that if you can make a mistake, so can I.  
As a normative claim, smugness does not affect expressivists, as it does not take any 
stance on normative claims. If expressivism entails smugness, then so be it. However, 
Egan says quasi-realists cannot be smug by default (Egan 2007, 210). Egan's 
interpretation is based on speculation of how ordinary moral thought and discourse works, 
as well as Simon Blackburn’s own words (Egan 2007, 210). At least from the outset, 
Egan’s supposition does not seem too outlandish. Claiming ourselves immune to an error 
which others could make does seem to be incompatible with ordinary moralizing and so 
it goes against the goal of quasi-realism.  
  
The second claim Egan makes is about the stability of a moral belief or judgement. With 
a stable belief Egan means that despite any possible improvement of the epistemic 
situation, like gaining more information or after hearing a convincing argument to the 
contrary, that belief would not be abandoned (Egan 2007, 212). Egan also calls this kind 
of a stable judgement a fundamental belief, as it must be part of the core beliefs of a 
person. However, even if person A would not drop her moral belief M, making it a 
fundamental belief, does not mean that she is right. Person B might as well have a 
fundamental moral belief that non-M and, ruling out moral relativism, at most one of 




STABLE ERROR: It is possible for someone’s stable belief to be mistaken (Egan 2007, 
213). 
 
Egan’s third claim is compared with Blackburn’s definition of quasi-realist uncertainty. 
Egan fully endorses Blackburn’s explanation of uncertainty as the only viable one for 
expressivists (Egan 2007, 214). But taken together, QUASI-REALIST UNCERTAINTY 
is about wondering if one would drop the belief in question after an improvement in 
epistemic situation, but if the belief in question is a stable belief, it would not be changed 
after any improvement. This means that no stable belief can be doubted so that a quasi-
realist is necessarily committed to: 
 
FIRST-PERSON IMMUNITY: I have an a priori guarantee against fundamental moral 
error (Egan 2007, 214).  
 
FIRST-PERSON IMMUNITY does not mean a priori certainty about any particular 
belief: it is a certainty about the sentence "I cannot have a stable moral belief, which is 
mistaken". The a priori certainty does not extend to other people's beliefs. As STABLE 
BELIEF entails, other people's stable beliefs can be doubted. I can judge that even if 
someone has a stable moral belief and would not change it no matter what improvement 
in their epistemic situation, nevertheless they should change that belief. It seems that a 
quasi-realist has a privilege to say that she, and only she, cannot be fundamentally 
mistaken.  
  
It is easy to see that if Egan’s argumentation is correct, quasi-realists are committed to 
conflicting claims. If people's stable beliefs can be mistaken, but my stable beliefs cannot 
be mistaken, I violate NO SMUGNESS. It looks like one of the claims must be abandoned 
for quasi-realism to be internally coherent.  
 
3.2 Re-defining the Task 
 
The problem described in the last section has come under scrutiny and Egan’s analysis 
turns out to be critically flawed. Simon Blackburn has written about the issue, and his 
reply is significant beyond just replying to Egan. Blackburn clarifies just what quasi-
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realist expressivism is committed to and how Egan makes a mistake in what is the 
question that expressivists are actually trying to answer. Egan’s mistake turns out to be a 
common one. This section will explain Blackburn’s reply and after that, revisit Egan’s 
problem statement with Sebastian Köhler in order to find out what type of explanation is 
really needed from quasi-realists regarding uncertainty and stable beliefs.  
  
Blackburn focuses on the term “stability” 2  when presenting his counter-argument. 
Blackburn points out that Egan’s use of “stability” is not precise and can be understood in 
two widely different senses (Blackburn 2009, 205-206). A stable moral belief can be 
understood as a belief that the believer would not abandon due to any change in her 
epistemic situation, which she would consider as an improvement. The key concept here 
is the improvement of the epistemic situation. While an improvement in an epistemic 
situation is easy to think of, like learning that the Great Wall of China cannot really be 
seen from the space, what is a change in the epistemic situation that the belief holder 
would not think as an improvement? One option would be a change brought about by 
deceit or misinformation. A more interesting one would be a case where the belief holder 
would not in her current situation endorse the change. In the current American political 
climate, it is easy to imagine that even if a deeply-rooted Republican could learn 
something which would make her a Democrat, in her current state she would not think 
that change an improvement. Understood like this, stability is a matter of subjective 
opinion at the moment of thinking about the belief.  
 
Another way to understand a stabile moral belief is that the belief would not change after 
any improvement in the epistemic situation of the believer. The crucial difference to the 
earlier definition is that now the improvement does not take into account what the believer 
herself thinks about the improvement. The improvement is now a genuine improvement, 
making it an objective fact. As these two senses of the word “stability” is used in Egan’s 
article, he mixes subjective and objective perspectives in his argumentation. As 
Blackburn points out, the latter one results in a stable belief which is unarguably a true 
belief: if the belief cannot be improved at all, it must be true (Blackburn 2009, 206). After 
all, learning the truth would be an objective improvement. If improvement is understood 
 
2 This, incidentally, is the only term that Egan uses which does not originate from Blackburn 
himself. So, Blackburn’s focus on this specific term is not that surprising. 
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in this objective sense the STABLE ERROR, which said that people’s stable beliefs can 
be mistaken, is false. 
 
To salvage the STABLE ERROR, stability must be understood in its subjective sense. 
However, if this is so, the FIRST-PERSON IMMUNITY, which said that I have a priori 
certainty that my stable belief is true, can be understood to be a normative judgement. Or 
so expressivists would say, as the FIRST-PERSON IMMUNITY could now be 
understood to state: if I judge that any improvement, which I endorse, in my epistemic 
situation would not warrant dropping a belief, that belief is true. Now, this is a claim 
about what is a true moral judgement, and a very implausible one as well. As Blackburn 
is keen to emphasise, expressivism and quasi-realism are not in the business of offering 
answers to these types of questions (Blackburn 2009, 207). Quasi-realist is a quietist 
about moral truth: she takes no sides or provides answers to moral questions while doing 
metaethics.  
 
Quietism about what are moral truths, and what makes a moral judgement a true 
judgment, is in the heart of expressivism. Blackburn's answer to Egan illustrates that 
expressivists only need to explain what we do when are making judgements on moral 
issues. The quasi-realist package only adds a commitment to explain why those 
judgements can be said to be true or false, not why they are so. Objective truth conditions 
are outside of a quasi-realist analysis. Egan demands answers from quasi-realists which 
they do not need to give. Be that as it may, a slight rephrasing and refocus of Egan's 
problem statement gives quasi-realists a more difficult problem to solve. Sebastian 
Köhler accepts Blackburn's answer to Egan but modifies the challenge to focus on what 
Blackburn is promising to give: an explanation of what is the state of mind of a subject 
when she doubts a judgement she judges stable (Köhler 2015, 163).  
 
Remember that Blackburn’s explanation of uncertainty, QUASI-REALIST 
UNCERTAINTY, was expressing a possibility that a moral belief might change after an 
improvement in the epistemic situation. Taking this as a starting point, Köhler describes 
a machine called “moral sensibility” that generates moral judgements from mental states. 
Much like a coffee machine takes coffee beans and water as an input and after a specific 
process outputs a coffee, moral sensibility eats mental states and produces moral 
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judgements. This moral sensibility is similar to mechanical machines also in that the parts 
that make it, mental dispositions, are individually changeable. Köhler now argues that 
“improvement” can be understood in terms of changing some of the mental dispositions 
in order to have a better moral sensibility, in effect a better machine for generating moral 
judgements. (Köhler 2015, 163.)  
  
Taking the above as a starting point, judging that A’s moral belief M can be erroneous 
would now be a complex judgement, consisting of two different sub-judgements: 
 
(1) A judgement that any sensibility S(x) is better than any other sensibility S(y), 
if S(x) has certain features F(1), F(2),...., or F(x) which S(y) lacks. 
(2) A judgment that there might be (at least) one feature F(x), which is such that 
A’s sensibility S lacks it and such that, if A’s sensibility changed so that it had 
F(x), M would be abandoned.  (Köhler 2015, 163). 
  
First sub-judgement is about having a general understanding that some sensibilities are 
better than other sensibilities based on some features. These features are dependent on 
the person making the judgement, so these can be anything from coherence to kindness. 
The second sub-judgement is then all about pointing out that A’s moral sensibility might 
lack a feature which would make it a better sensibility, and that this would also mean that 
A would abandon belief M.     
 
To push the original analogy further, we are now judging that this coffee machine might 
produce worse coffee than another coffee machine, because it lacks a part that the other 
coffee machine has. In this way, Köhler is highlighting the result from Blackburn’s idea 
that it is the process, not the belief itself, which should be under investigation. When we 
are uncertain whether one of our moral belief’s is correct, we are not focusing on the 
belief itself, but are wondering whether the process which produced that belief is 
somehow faulty. 
  
After defining uncertainty, Köhler comes to the issue of stability. To think that an agent 




   
(3) A judgment that A would not consider any sensibility that would not produce 
moral belief M better than A’s sensibility S, which does produce moral belief 
M. 
 
As someone who is not A, judging that belief M is mistaken is a coherent thought. The 
above three judgements do not contradict each other, so anyone not-A is free to express 
that A's belief M is both stable and that it might be erroneous. Now the trouble for 
expressivists comes when she should doubt her own belief J, that she also judges stable. 
In this case, she would need to express these three thoughts: 
 
(1) A judgement that any sensibility S(x) is better than any other sensibility S(y), 
if S(x) has certain features F(1), F(2),...., or F(x) which S(y) lacks. 
(4) A judgment that there might be (at least) one feature F(x), which is such that 
my sensibility S(z) lacks it and such that, if my sensibility changed so that it 
had F(x), I would abandon J.  
(5) A judgment that no other sensibility S(x) that would not produce moral belief 
J is better than my sensibility S, which does produce moral belief J. 
 
As can be seen, this is not a coherent thought. It seems that if (1) is a good description of 
error, and (5) is what a judgement of stability means, (4) is an impossible thought. Based 
on this result, Köhler concludes that an expressivist does have an a priori guarantee that 
she, and only she, cannot be fundamentally mistaken. (Köhler 2015, 164-165.)  
  
While well formulated, Köhler’s conclusion seems to be a bit too quick. What Köhler is 
looking for is for Blackburn to explain what is the mental state that you have when you 
judge your belief stable, but also possibly mistaken. Now the question is not anymore 
about what a mistaken belief is, or what makes a belief wrong. It is about the mental states 
that we have when doing these kinds of judgements, and that really is something 
expressivists and quasi-realists must say something about. However, just the fact that 
these two judgements cannot co-exists when thinking about a particular belief does not 
mean any a priori certainty that we cannot be wrong in general. What it means is that 
when we judge our belief stable, we cannot entertain that it can also be a false belief. This 
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inability to doubt is a far cry from a priori certainty that if we judge something stable, we 
cannot be wrong.  
 
This does not mean that the threat of smugness is not still very much present. If it turns 
out that expressivism cannot accommodate a mental state that allows for doubting our 
own stable moral belief while allowing to judge everyone else’s stable moral beliefs false, 
quasi-realism faces the judgement of smugness that Egan accused it of. While Blackburn 
correctly identified a problem with Egan’s account, the argument can be rewritten so that 
it still needs a better answer than what Blackburn gave. The argument will be explored in 
the next section from this new understanding at what is really at stake and what should 
be expected from a quasi-realist’s answer to it. 
 
3.3 Going Ecumenical 
 
As was seen in the last section, quasi-realists and expressivists need to give accounts of 
what mental states are involved in judging a moral belief to be stable, while being 
uncertain of it as well. If they cannot give that explanation, they risk being called smug 
and quasi-realism fails to achieve its goal. It comes as no surprise that answers from 
expressivists concentrate on exploring those two mental states. Concentrating on the 
mental states involved also means that while the problem is more severe for quasi-realists, 
all the answers seek to vindicate the problem by exploring how expressivism in general 
should be modified so that it avoids the accusation of smugness. The answer, it seems, 
lies in vindicating all expressivists, not just quasi-realists. 
 
Michael Ridge modifies the original formulation of doubting our own moral belief to 
better suit his form of expressivism, called ecumenical expressivism. Expressivism comes 
in different flavours and the original one explained in the section 2.1 is called pure 
expressivism. As discussed, expressivism says that a normative judgement gets its 
meaning from the non-cognitive state of mind of the agent expressing the judgement 
(Toppinen 2014, 13). Pure expressivism only deals with this one non-cognitive state of 
mind whereas a later form of expressivism says that a normative judgement has a 
descriptive part as well. The meaning of a normative judgement still comes from the non-
cognitive state of mind, but two states of mind are expressed at the same time. In the 
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simplest way, the normative judgement can express a dislike of actions of some type and 
a belief that a certain action has those consequences. To be against littering could be 
expressing a desire for maximising happiness and a belief that littering will hinder that 
pursuit. This type of expressivism is called hybrid expressivism. 
 
Ridge’s ecumenical expressivism started as a hybrid theory but has evolved into an even 
more complex theory, called relational expressivism. According to relational 
expressivism, our normative judgements express a relational state, where our desire-like 
states and beliefs are related in a suitable way. Ridge’s ecumenical expressivism is, highly 
simplified, an explanation of normative and epistemic judgements as expressing 
normative perspectives, which rule out standards, and a belief suitably related to that 
perspective (Ridge 2015, 8-9). The normative perspective is Ridge’s term for the 
traditional nonrepresentative state of mind, which expressivism claims is at the bottom of 
a normative belief. However, unlike most traditional expressivists, Ridge thinks that this 
normative perspective only rules out normative standards (Ridge 2015, 8).  
 
How does all of this work? Ridge (2015, 9) gives an example of what a judgment of 
“morally I must give to charity” would consist of according to his theory. To make a 
judgement that “giving to a charity is morally required” consists of a normative 
perspective and a belief that all acceptable moral standards (i.e. those not ruled out by the 
aforementioned normative perspective) would require us to give to a charity, where moral 
standard is a shorthand for all of an agent’s moral principles in a given time (Ridge 2015, 
9). In this way, the normative perspective denies endorsement of some moral principles, 
in effect committing the agent to act in ways not described by these denied moral 
principles, and the belief part of the normative judgement describes the situation as one 
that would be acceptable for a moral principle not ruled out in this way. In a way, the 
normative perspective sets the scene of what is a permissible way to reason, and the belief 
then describes that the situation in question would either be endorsed or not endorsed by 
permissible reasoning.   
 
As Ridge’s account is different from standard expressivism endorsed by Blackburn, he 
also gives a different formulation of uncertainty. Ridge’s formulation taps into the 
epistemic standards that you endorse (or what your normative perspective allows for you 
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to have, to be exact) and what certitude that epistemic standard allows for the moral 
judgement in question. This makes uncertainty a hybrid state that expresses two states of 
mind: 
 
(6) a normative perspective 
(7) a belief that some admissible epistemic standard (that is, some such standard 
compatible with the speaker’s normative perspective at the time of utterance) 
would, given some contextually specified body of evidence, permit not assigning 
a much higher credence to p than not-p, if one assigns them credences at all. 
(Ridge 2015, 12).  
 
As with the purely normative case of moral judgements, the epistemic judgement of 
uncertainty also deals with standards of thinking and reasoning which are not permitted. 
The difference to the moral version is that the epistemic judgment is about permitting a 
standard, which would permit a credence assignment. Note that this is only about 
permitting a thought that the moral judgement in question could not be true, so it is a 
counterfactual situation, not a definite doubt. For Ridge, being uncertain about a moral 
belief like “killing is wrong” is to think that there is a permissible way of thinking about 
the issue that would permit (an unspecified amount of) lowering of credence about that 
issue. It is not actually giving the judgment lower credence, but simply entertaining the 
idea that it would be ok for it to be lower. 
 
Now that uncertainty is defined for ecumenical expressivists, is it compatible with a 
judgement of stability? Initially, Ridge says yes. A stable belief would now be: 
 
(8) agent A’s belief p, where given agent’s epistemic standards, normative 
perspective and evidence, it is permissible for A to have much higher credence 
on p than not-p and any subjective improvements A can have would not overturn 
that state of affairs (Ridge 2015, 14).  
 
In more simple terms, judging some belief stable is to judge that it is more much likely 
to be the case that that belief is true than that it is false, and to think that this will not 
change. How much more likely it needs to be is not defined by Ridge, but somewhere 
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around the vicinity of full certainty is what he seems to be after. According to Ridge, 
demanding full certainty from a potential stable belief would be too strict, as people are 
rarely entirely certain of anything if pressed hard enough (Ridge 2015, 12-13). For now, 
we can accept Ridge’s argument and move on, but we will return to this point later on in 
this thesis. The latter part of the judgement of stability is the actual stability part, as that 
says that this state of (near) certainty would not change after any improvements A 
recognises as improvements.  
 
Ridge points out that combining the judgements of stability and uncertainty is now 
contradictory. (2) would not permit assigning much higher credence to p given the 
evidence, but (3) would simultaneously permit just that. Permitting and not-permitting 
the credence assignment with the same evidence is not coherent. To salvage the situation, 
Ridge gives an ingenious account by describing that the counterfactual situations 
described in the case of uncertainty and in the judgement of stability are different. As 
Köhler already mentioned, uncertainty is expressed by “this belief might be mistaken”. 
According to Ridge, in this sentence “might” applies to all possible worlds. When being 
uncertain of something, you allow that something you have not even thought possible 
could come up and overturn your belief (Ridge 2015, 16-17). In contrast, the judgement 
of stability concerns only nearby worlds. When judging that p is a stable belief, we only 
think about relatively close possibilities of what we might encounter and how we would 
then behave (Ridge 2015, 16-17). By making the two situation describe different 
modalities, Ridge can say that the stability judgement’s “would not overturn this belief” 
is compatible with the “this belief might be mistaken” of uncertainty. The example Ridge 
gives is that he is really certain that if he drops a pen, it would drop to the floor, but at the 
same time can entertain the possibility that in a distant possible world it might not do that 
(Ridge 2015, 17). As for a moral example, we could say that I have a stable belief that 
“giving to a charity is a good thing”, but would not rule out that if I met a moral saint 
whom I would respect, she could overturn this belief, as unlikely as that is. The “would” 
does not make the belief 100% certain. 
 
As ingenious as Ridge’s ides is, it does not ultimately succeed in saving expressivism and 
quasi-realism. Quite simply, just changing the “would not” to “could not” in the definition 
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of stability will undo all the progress Ridge makes, as he himself acknowledges. While 
“would” can be thought as a counterfactual condition where we think about the 
possibilities we might imagine happening, “could” takes into account all possible worlds. 
Now both stability and uncertainty are operating with the same modality. Thus, while 
Ridge does a commendable job in describing the states of minds in detail, he does not 
solve the issue of smugness. Ridge knows this and bites the bullet: he acknowledges that 
expressivists end up in a situation that no realist needs to end up, and that this really is a 
smug situation (Ridge 2015, 18). In expressivism’s defence, he says that anyone who 
judges their moral judgement to be this stable is smug in any case and so that should not 
be thought as a defect of expressivism (Ridge 2015, 18). While probably a reasonable 
conclusion, this does not leave Egan’s argument’s force to be any less than it is in the 
original form. All expressivists are still committed to smugness regarding their own stable 
moral beliefs. In the end, all Ridge accomplishes is to further clarify the technical details 
of the challenge, but not solve the problem. 
 
3.4 Introducing I-trajectory 
 
Like Michael Ridge, Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons (2015) also aim to solve the 
challenge by clarifying the main terms in question, stability and uncertainty. As Ridge, 
Horgan and Timmons aim to show that all expressivists can avoid being smug, and so 
their focus is on the expressivist explanation of the issue.  The route that they take is, alas, 
a rather complicated one. Their explanation, and its problems, are explained in this 
section. 
 
To understand what it means to acknowledge that one might be wrong according to 
Horgan and Timmons, a few terms need to be defined first. First of all, they call the 
process of improvement I-trajectory, which is a factually accurate, cognitively 
competent, seeming-improvement trajectory (Horgan & Timmons 2015, 197). In plainer 
terms, to have an I-trajectory is to experience a change in one’s moral beliefs that relies 
on only correct non-moral beliefs, is seen by one as an improvement and is an exercise 
of one’s cognitive competences, i.e. is a result of one’s own thought process. Stability is 
defined as an exclusion from this improvement process, and it is called I-stability. An I-
stable moral belief is one that has no I-trajectories that could lead to a situation, where 
25 
 
that belief would be abandoned (Horgan & Timmons 2015, 197). So, an I-stable belief 
can only be changed by violating one of the clauses of I-trajectory, and thus that change 
is not an improvement. As can be seen, the “I-trajectory” is the key term here, with “I-
stability” just referencing whether there exists an I-trajectory or not. Stability is now a 
question of whether a process exists that could overturn the belief in question.  
 
Now for the uncertainty. For Horgan and Timmons (2015, 197), uncertainty in the form 
of a sentence “Ought p, but I might be mistaken” expresses a complex state of mind 
consisting of two different commitments: 
 
(1) a belief about an open epistemic possibility that some I-trajectory would lead 
me to a state of mind of not-ought p that is I-stable 
(2)  not-ought p, if an I-trajectory would lead me to a state of mind of not-ought p, 
that is I-stable 
 
What this means is that being less than entirely sure of “I should stop eating meat” is to 
be open to the idea that an improvement (as specified in I-trajectory) can lead me to 
abandon that moral belief. Horgan and Timmons use “open epistemic possibility” to 
denote that the uncertainty can arise from a wide variety of possibilities, which might not 
even be metaphysically possible. For example, I can engage in philosophically inclined 
debates about brain-in-the-vat such that I can confidently assert that I am not one, but still 
leave it as an open epistemic possibility (Horgan & Timmons 2015, 198). In this way 
Horgan and Timmons define uncertainty in similar way as Ridge does: uncertainty ranges 
across all possible worlds.  
 
As for the primary challenge, it is quite clear that Horgan and Timmons formulation of 
uncertainty and stability clash. If uncertainty admits a possibility that an I-trajectory 
might exist, and stability explicitly denies that such an I-trajectory could exist, these two 
states of minds cannot coexist. What Horgan and Timmons surprisingly get wrong is that 
they concede the a priori problem, which Andy Egan proposed, based on this. What they 




A PRIORI TRUTH: For any actual or potential moral opinion M of mine such that no I-
trajectory would take me from M to a state of mind M* such that (i) M* is incompatible 
with M, and (ii) M* is I-stable, M is correct (Horgan and Timmons 2015, 202). 
 
But if we recall the formulation of I-trajectory, it stated that the improvement must be 
perceived as an improvement by the belief holder. If we remember Simon Blackburn’s 
response to Egan, this is now actually a normative judgement about what is a correct 
moral opinion. Ruling out all I-trajectories does not mean stating that a moral opinion is 
true, unless that is how “a true moral opinion” is defined. As I-trajectory needs subjective 
experience of improvement, it is a widely unrealistic definition. And as Blackburn already 
stated, expressivists and quasi-realists are in no way required to make any commitments 
on what a true moral opinion is. In light of this, Horgan and Timmons should 
acknowledge instead what Sebastian Köhler demanded expressivists to explain: how can 
an expressivist express both uncertainty in a moral belief and a judgement of stability on 
that same moral belief. This latter statement is something which Horgan and Timmons 
can, and should, concede as impossible.  
 
In any case, Horgan and Timmons devote much of their account on explaining why the 
above account is not problematic. The above clarification does already lessen the value 
of some of their explanations. For example, they make a believable claim that one cannot 
have any guarantees that a specific moral belief is I-stable and make assumptions based 
on this claim. But whether any belief is actually I-stable does not really matter, as the real 
question is about a situation where one has judged that belief to be I-stable. If it actually 
is immune to change is another question altogether.  
 
Taking the above into account, Horgan and Timmons still have two arguments worth 
considering. First of all, they identify that smugness arises most clearly on disagreement. 
If I have an opinion on a moral matter which is contrary to yours, and I rule out doubting 
my own opinion, I do seem to be a prime example of a smug person. Horgan and Timmons 
do not endorse this view. They claim that preferring your opinions is natural; people do, 
and even should, give their views more weight than someone else's beliefs (Horgan & 
Timmons 2015, 202). In a fundamental disagreement with someone else, where our 
position is presenting our stable belief, we are entitled to hold ourselves to be correct 
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without being labelled as smug. In discussion with an intellectual peer, whom we end up 
in a disagreement with, it is sensible to hold our own opinion correct if we have examined 
the contrary argument and evidence with due diligence (Horgan & Timmons 2015, 202). 
If we disagree after due diligence, we conclude that the evidence does not point to the 
direction our opponent has ended, which means he has a skewed or somehow wrong 
epistemic sensibility (Horgan & Timmons 2015, 202). In a peer disagreement, with equal 
access and understanding of facts, we end up blaming the opponent's epistemic 
capabilities. Horgan and Timmons also note that according to expressivists, that is a 
normative judgement: we judge the opponent’s epistemic standards to be incorrect 
(Horgan & Timmons 2015, 203). 
 
While the previous explanation does seem plausible, it is by no means an acknowledged 
truth among epistemologists. Going into that debate is out of scope for this thesis, so it is 
just be pointed out that while Horgan and Timmons do have one possibility to defuse the 
smugness, it is by no means enough as it relies on somewhat controversial idea. This leads 
us to the next line of defence they have.  
 
To illustrate the argument, Horgan and Timmons give a different analysis of the 
problematic state of minds: 
 
NO I-TRAJECTORIES ERROR: Ought p, and yet I might be wrong even if it is not the 
case that some I-trajectory would take me from my current ought-p state of mind to a not-
ought p state of mind that would be I-stable (Horgan & Timmons 2015, 204). 
 
NO I-TRAJECTORIES ERROR is simply stating the uncertainty and stability is other 
words. But Horgan and Timmons dissect NO I-TRAJECTORIES ERROR as two 
different state of minds in a totally new way. According to them, the “ought p” is a 
normative judgement, and all that follow is a metaethical and metaphysical judgement 
(Horgan & Timmons 2015, 205). This latter part would now be a judgement of epistemic 
possibility of error even with no self-recognised possibilities of improvement. This is, 
according to Horgan and Timmons, an ontological commitment to moral properties, 
which expressivists would deny (Horgan & Timmons 2015, 205). While the judgement 
looks like a normal moral judgement, they define this as morally detached use of the 
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moral terms (Horgan & Timmons 2015, 207-208). It does not concern any of your current 
first-order moral judgements, instead it is about metaphysics. If Horgan and Timmons are 
correct, expressivists can acknowledge that for them, NO I-TRAJECTORIES ERROR is 
an impossible state of mind, but that the question is about metaethics, not ordinary 
normative talk and so there is no problem. 
 
It is not clear if Horgan and Timmons are right about moving the issue to metaethics. 
After all, it is not clear what should be understood as a metaethical question versus 
ordinary normative or moral talk. If only invoking a seemingly ontological commitment 
on moral properties is required to change the judgement from everyday moralizing to 
metaethics, that can have unintended consequences. For example, saying “it is true that 
killing is wrong, and it is true no matter what I think” seems to express an ontological 
commitment to moral truth, but it is still a judgement which a quasi-realists would want 
to enable for us. Unless clearer reasons for the move are put forward, it remains an open 
question whether the issue properly belongs to metaethics and could be ignored by 
expressivists. Horgan and Timmon’s answer also does not help to mitigate the smugness 
question. Denying NO I-TRAJECTORIES ERROR is only relevant when thinking of my 
own moral judgments, but even if you have no available I-trajectories that would lead you 
to abandon your current belief, I can still say you have an error. The asymmetry of error-
possibility remains a problem to be solved. 
 
What this all means, in the end, is that Ridge, Horgan and Timmons are all biting the 
bullet. They all give accounts of what it means to doubt one’s moral judgements and what 
a judgement of stability means, but in the end, all agree that expressivists are committed 
to Egan’s charge of asymmetry. Solving or explaining the smugness is critical for quasi-
realism to be internally coherent. Why is it not smug to not being able to doubt your stable 
moral beliefs, while still retaining the possibility to doubt other persons stable moral 
beliefs? In the next section we will explore how James Lenman has tried to defuse the 







3.5 Different Moral Communities 
 
As seen in the previous section, expressivists and quasi-realists face the accusation of 
smugness no matter how uncertainty and stability are defined. If expressivists need to 
concede that you cannot doubt your own stable beliefs, while everyone else’s stable belief 
are suspect, they are committed to smugness and quasi-realism looks likely to fail. We 
already saw how Michael Ridge, Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons all conceded that the 
asymmetry exists and that this smugness is a threat to quasi-realism. They all tried to 
downplay the accusation of smugness, with varying success. Before summarising the 
findings and proposing a way forward, this section goes through how James Lenman 
attempts to solve the same problem by approaching the problem from a different angle 
from everyone else.  
  
Main body of Lenman’s argument explores what smugness really is and where it 
manifests. He concludes that while Blackburn managed to defuse part of Egan’s 
accusation by exploring the difference between a true improvement and an improvement 
as a subjective judgement, quasi-realist must still worry about the smugness (Lenman 
2014, 238).  To illustrate his point, Lenman considers cases where the fundamental 
disagreement might happen between two people. Fundamental disagreement is where the 
smugness, as it is, will manifest: if we have a fundamental disagreement regarding a 
particular moral belief, I will hold myself right and you wrong, and I will believe that it 
is a defensible position to be in. Is this smug? 
 
Lenman argues that the problem of smugness is avoided by focusing on what a 
conversation between people is all about. For Lenman the idea is that in a normal 
conversation we do listen each other, and try to end up in an agreement, as that is what 
living in a shared community is all about (Lenman 2014, 241). If we engage in this type 
of productive conversation, we cannot be accused of smugness. While Lenman invokes 
some virtue ethics in his article to justify this result, and thus takes the discussion slightly 
out of metaethics, what he successfully does is to highlight that a truly fundamental moral 
disagreement 3  is a rare thing. We usually presuppose that our disagreement is not 
 
3 To make the terms explicitly clear: to have a fully moral disagreement needs both participants 




fundamental when we engage in a conversation (Lenman 2014, 242). Otherwise, what 
would be the point of that conversation? 
  
While that might be a correct view about our everyday life, there lingers a doubt that 
fundamental disagreement about moral issues is possible. We can readily imagine beings 
so different that we would be in a fundamental disagreement with them. What Lenman 
says about that situation is not fully satisfactory. He concludes that a discussion with these 
kinds of beings is pointless, but nonetheless, he would not want to draw a smug 
conclusion that he is right while those alien others from a totally different moral 
community are wrong (Lenman 2014, 243). The aliens are just different, not wrong. 
Smugness, in Lenman’s terms, appears to be a vice that can only manifest between beings 
from the same moral community. It seems that Lenman thinks we do not belong to the 
same moral community if we have a fundamental moral disagreement, and thus smugness 
is not implied by just being certain that our moral beliefs are stable. For Lenman, a 
community is about people sharing some norms or standards, which to live by. A 
fundamental separation of moral values will separate communities by definition, and 
cross-community judgments are not about wrongness, they just express differences. 
 
While he might have a point here, it does not seem to exhaust all the relevant options. In 
particular, I would not personally want to say that alien others, whom I have a 
fundamental disagreement with, are not wrong. If they come up with a moral judgement 
of “wanton cruelty is desirable”, I will judge that they are wrong. Furthermore, I will be 
pretty smug about my judgment and insist that I could not be wrong in this issue. 
Smugness can thus arise, even if the participants in the disagreement are from different 
moral communities. In the end, Lenman’s suggestion faces the same objections as all the 
other attempted solutions. No matter how much explanations quasi-realists offer, there 
seems to remain a sense by which all expressivists are committed to something that 
 
needs first agreement about God’s existence and relevant facts about God’s commands. These 
are all descriptive beliefs, not moral or normative. To have a fully moral disagreement means 
that both participants share agreement about all descriptive facts affecting the issue and only 
disagree on what moral judgements should be drawn. Useful, if not fully accepted, explanation 
of moral disagreement can be found in C.L. Stevenson: Ethics and Language (1944). Also, for 
present purposes, fundamental disagreement can only arise between beings that are fully 
rational and fully informed. That rarely, if ever, is the case between actual human beings. 
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realists are not, and that the realist’s position seems to line better with ordinary moral 
thought. 
 
What this chapter has explored is the question of what certainty in moral beliefs is, how 
is the improvement of moral views defined, and what happens in a situation of a 
fundamental moral disagreement. Egan’s original accusation was flawed in many ways, 
and the crux of the issue really lies in the question of smugness and why the two mental 
states of stability and uncertainty are in conflict. As Köhler demanded, expressivists and 
quasi-realists are fully accountable for explaining what type of mental states are in play 
when you doubt your stable judgements, or at least for clarifying why that is not possible 
in the normative case so that the common normative thought can be preserved. 
 
While no account explored here succeeded in solving the previous question, Michael 
Ridge did accomplish to point out that the concept of certitude is linked with both stability 
and uncertainty as understood here. The most useful bit of Ridge’s article might turn out 
to be his investigation of how much certitude a stability judgement presupposes. Ridge 
argues that “must” is typically used in ordinary moral discourse and thought without 
committing to full certainty, which is why he explained stability in terms of much higher 
credence in p versus not-p (Ridge 2015, 12-13). He reasoned that only a critically few 
judgements or beliefs are as certain as the proposition that “1+1=2” is, and thus 
demanding equivalent certitude would be too much. For Ridge, this means that we need 
to allow for stable beliefs to be at least marginally less than fully certain in order to 
account for ordinary normative discourse. But is this so, and how less than full certainty 
and full certainty should even be understood? 
 
It is clear that credences need to be investigated more thoroughly to get to the bottom of 
this question. Awkwardly for quasi-realists, it turns out that accounting certitude of 
normative judgements might be particularly problematic for expressivism. Exploring the 
problems that have been raised about credence will shed light on the issues dealt with in 
this chapter. The next chapter explains why credences are problematic for expressivists 






4 PROBLEMATIC CREDENCES 
 
4.1 Three Features of a Moral Belief  
 
As we have seen in the previous chapters, expressivism proposes a seemingly radically 
different view of what a moral belief or an evaluative judgement is and how it functions. 
The flipside of this view is that it exposes expressivism to an accusation that it cannot 
capture all the complexities of a belief that cognitivism can. In the previous chapter we 
saw that uncertainty in beliefs which we judge stable is one the problems expressivism 
and quasi-realism faces. At the end of the last chapter it was argued that full certainty and 
credences must be investigated more thoroughly in order to find out what the judgement 
of stability means. Unfortunately, accounting for credences is one of these complexities 
of a belief which expressivism has trouble to explain. This section will outline how 
Michael Smith identifies three features of moral beliefs and evaluative judgements, how 
he argues that expressivists cannot accommodate all three, and why credence seems to be 
the most difficult to one for expressivists. 
 
Michael Smith states that when an agent has a belief, common sense tells us that it has 
two features. The first is the level of confidence or certitude we have about that belief, 
and the second is how robust that belief is (Smith 2002, 306-307). Confidence about a 
belief is in effect the level of certainty that that belief is true. Now, this certitude can vary 
between different beliefs; I am very certain that Finland is part of the European Union, a 
bit less certain that my older son is currently at home and somewhat uncertain that it will 
rain tomorrow. If for some reason these different beliefs would clash, and I would be 
required to act according to one, and only one, of these beliefs, all things being equal I 
would act according to the one that I have the most certainty of being right. 
 
Unarguably confidence in different beliefs comes in degrees. The conventional way to 
capture this is to normalise the degree of belief as ranging between 0 and 1, with 0 being 
utter disbelief and 1 absolute certainty (Schwitzgebel 2019). In this way, the confidence 
levels of different beliefs can be compared. A natural way to explain normalised degrees 
of belief in action is to use betting behaviour as an analogy, as Smith also does (Smith 
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2002, 307). A normalised degrees of belief is described as the amount that a subject is 
willing to wager on the bet that will pay 0 if the outcome is negative and 1 if the outcome 
is positive. If I am uncertain that it will rain tomorrow, but still regard it as a more likely 
situation than not raining, I should bet more than 0,5, but less than 1. As is the case with 
many other philosophical inquiries, several names are applied to the same concept; 
confidence, certitude, certainty, degree of belief, credence. While the names have slightly 
different connotations, and for example degree of a belief is commonly thought as a 
misleading name, they all mean the same thing: how confident an agent is that a 
proposition is true. 
 
The second feature, robustness of a belief, is closely connected to the certitude but 
captures a different facet of it. According to Smith, robustness captures how likely or how 
much the belief in question varies in time (Smith 2002, 308). The variance is explained 
by incoming information and reflection on the subject, which might affect an agent's 
certitude of the belief in question. Robustness of a belief can thus also be called the 
stability of a belief: how likely it is that this belief of mine will change in time, and thus 
not dissimilar to the concept Egan introduced and was encountered earlier in this thesis. 
To illustrate the issue, Smith asks us to consider a case where a mother is currently equally 
certain that her son is a responsible supermarket worker, and that her local football team 
is the most talented one (Smith 2002, 308). While the certitude of both of her beliefs is 
the same, the belief in her son’s responsibility can easily be believed to be more robust 
than her belief in the competence of a football team. Some of the reasons are 
psychological (maybe she does not want to believe any contrary evidence of her son’s 
behaviour), but some can be called epistemological (maybe she already knows more 
about her son’s situation and behaviour than the abilities of a football team). In any case, 
the difference should be clear. It takes more to change some beliefs than others.  
 
In addition to these two features, moral beliefs also have a third one: how important we 
deem the belief in question. An example will clarify the concept. If an agent believes both 
free time and material wellbeing as desirable, we can always ask the question: “which is 
more desirable?”. To fully explore the concept, this question presupposes that in making 
those two judgements, the agent is omniscient, and both her beliefs have equal certitude. 
Also, to fully make the commitments explicit, we need to have a condition that at some 
34 
 
point the increase of free time will decrease material wellbeing and vice versa. So, the 
real question is that when things are in balance, should there be more material wellbeing 
or more free time? The importance of these beliefs to the agent decides on what she 
answers. 
 
As Smith highlights, all these different features affect how motivated we are to perform 
different actions. If certitude is the same, rational agents act according to the belief which 
has more importance and vice versa: if the importance of two beliefs is the same, rational 
agents should act according to the more certain belief. Lastly, the motivation to do 
different actions should follow the robustness of the belief. More robust an agent's belief, 
the motivation to follow that belief changes less in time. In order to explain the motivation 
to do actions, a theory of moral beliefs should be able to explain all these features. Smith 
argues that while cognitivist can explain why moral beliefs have these three features, non-
cognitivists cannot (Smith 2002, 316).  
 
Smith’s point is illustrated best by using a pure expressivist theory as an example. As 
previously discussed, pure expressivism states that evaluative judgements are not beliefs, 
but expressions of desire-like states. Thus, pure expressivists need to explain all the three 
features of evaluative judgements with features that desires have. Herein lies the problem, 
as desires seem to have only two features: strength and variance over time (Smith 2002, 
316). Subject’s desire of two different things can vary over how much subject desires 
them, and how the desire changes over time. When thinking of the three features Smith 
highlights, robustness can be mapped to the variance over time, but then the single feature 
of desire strength has to explain two different features, both importance and certitude 
(Smith 2002, 316-317). Smith poses a challenge for non-cognitivists: how to 
accommodate all these three features into their story of moral beliefs and judgements. 
 
4.2 Hybrid Solution 
 
As seen from the previous section, traditional pure expressivism faces the problem that it 
does not have enough structure to accommodate all the common-sense features of moral 
beliefs. A simple non-cognitive state-of-mind comparable to a desire does not seem to 
give room for all the relevant features that Smith has identified. Both Michael Ridge and 
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Jimmy Lenman have proposed that a hybrid version of expressivism could take care of 
all the three features. As explained earlier in section 3.3, hybrid expressivism says that 
when a moral judgement is made, an agent expresses both a desire and a belief (Toppinen 
2014, 48). Simplified, hybrid expressivism says that the desire expressed with a moral 
judgement is a desire for some things that are K and the belief expressed with the same 
moral judgement is that the object of the judgement is K.4  
 
Both Lenman and Ridge adopt features from Smith’s proposal of how a cognitivist can 
implement these three features. Smith (2002, 311) proposes that when we make a 
judgement that something is desirable, we have a belief that if we would be purged of all 
cognitive limitations and rational failings, we would still make the same judgement. To 
be purged of all cognitive limitations and rational failings would make us, in this case, 
and according to our belief, an ideal person to do the judgment. Or so says Smith. Ridge 
casts doubt on this and points out that calling a person without cognitive limitations and 
rational failings an ideal person to give judgments is actually a normative judgement 
(Ridge 2003, section 2). As he points out, someone might want that person to be altruistic 
while another would not. What Ridge is here suggesting is that as the characterisation of 
an ideal person is in itself a normative judgement, it is unfit for the role Smith gives it.  
 
In light of this, Ridge proposes a way of explaining normative judgements, with a slight 
modification to Smith’s ideal person idea. Ridge suggests that when an agent makes a 
normative judgement about an action, she expresses a desire to do actions that the ideal 
advisor she endorses would recommend and that this action is a one that the advisor would 
recommend (Ridge 2003, section 2). What kind of ideal advisor they would think of 
would change from person to person, as would the imagined recommendations of said 
advisor. Ridge’s proposal does not make any qualifications on the advisor she would have, 




4 What is said here of moral and evaluative judgements naturally apply to all moral beliefs, but to make 
the difference between hybrid expressivism and cognitivist realism clear, “moral judgement” is widely 
used in this chapter. As already gone through in section 2.3, expressivists tend to use “judgement” to 
make the difference to realism clear, but quasi-realists want to reclaim the right to use “belief”. This tends 




In the above proposal the concept of certitude is simply the level of an agent’s confidence 
that her ideal advisor would recommend this action and the strength of her desire to act 
according to the advisor’s recommendations, robustness is her judgement’s resistance to 
change and importance just maps different actions in the order that her ideal advisor 
would endorse them (Ridge 2003, section 2 ). In this way Ridge can explain all the three 
features that require explanation. It is vital to notice how Ridge does this; the critical 
element in evading the problem that pure expressivism faces is to introduce the belief 
component to the judgement. Now certitude is not only a feature or strength of a desire-
like attitude but also consists of the strength of the subject's belief that the action really 
would be recommended by her ideal advisor. Much like moral judgements overall in 
hybrid expressivism, certitude also turns out to be a hybrid function of both a belief and 
a desire-like attitude.  
 
Jimmy Lenman’s account is almost identical to Ridge’s version, but Lenman explains 
certitude of a moral judgement only with the belief part of the expressed judgement, 
ditching the strength of the desire according to the way ideal advisor would recommend. 
For Lenman (2003, sections 5 and 6), the strength to act according to the 
recommendations of the ideal advisor is best left to complement the agent's own, first-
order strength of desire to act according to the judgement in question, together accounting 
for the weakness of the will, that we are all guilty of. While the difference between 
Lenman’s and Ridge’s versions seems small, those differences have significant 
consequence. Those will be made clear in the next section, where the problems both 
versions have will be investigated. 
 
4.3 Problems with Hybrid Expressivist Account 
 
Krister Bykvist and Jonas Olson (2009) have published a critique of Ridge’s account and 
listed some key points for expressivists to answer. Bykvist and Olson agree with Ridge 
that expressivism has the most problems with taking care of certitude, as the other two 
features seem to be readily explained even by pure expressivism. There are two main 
problems that Bykvist and Olson direct to both Ridge’s and Lenman’s account of 
certitude. The first problem is the normalisation of certitude, that also ties into the cross-
attitudinal comparison of moral judgements and descriptive beliefs. This normalisation 
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problem is a problem for pure expressivism as well, not just for hybrid expressivism and 
concerns both Ridge’s and Lenman’s versions. The second problem is aimed directly at 
Ridge’s account of certitude and concerns the issue of how the strength of the desire-like 
attitude should be understood. 
 
The first problem Bykvist and Olson identify is the normalisation problem. As already 
discussed earlier when explaining Smith’s challenge, certitude in different beliefs is 
commonly normalised as a number between 0 and 1 in order to enable comparisons 
between different beliefs. In the normalisation of certitude, 0 is represented by a total lack 
of confidence and 1 as complete certainty. Now the problem that Bykvist and Olson point 
out for traditional form of expressivism is that desire does not seem to have a natural 
maximum. 0 can be represented by total indifference, but “maximum desire” does not 
seem to spell out anything intelligible (Bykvist & Olson 2009, 212). Normalisation is 
problematic is there is no natural maximum.  
 
Normalising the certitude of a belief between 0 and 1 also enables it to be tracked by the 
betting behaviour of a subject, which is a crucial point in Smith’s explanation of certitude. 
If moral certitude cannot be normalised between 0 and 1, but should be understood to be 
between 0 and ∞, betting behaviour cannot track it, and it poses problems with comparing 
certitude of a moral belief with that of a descriptive belief. In that case, the scale is 
different for the descriptive beliefs and moral judgments, making comparisons 
meaningless. Bykvist and Olson think this is important because, on their view, cross-
attitudinal comparisons should be possible. As an example, they write that subject S can 
be more confident of “2+2=4” than “utilitarianism is true” (Bykvist & Olson 2009, 212). 
They also point out that without a scale to measure the confidence one has in the different 
propositions, it seems puzzling how to compare the certitude of a descriptive belief and a 
desire-like state of mind (Bykvist & Olson 2009, 212). A common scale is needed, they 
argue.  
 
In a later paper Bykvist and Olson slightly pivot to argue that even solving the 
normalisation issue and coming up with a common scale does not solve the cross-
attitudinal problem (Bykvist & Olson 2012, 5). The argument is not a strong one, as it 
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rests on intuitions and non-examined assumptions. Bykvist and Olson propose that beliefs 
and motivational non-cognitive attitudes are so different, that comparing the strength of 
the two seems too complicated and that cognitivist will not have the same problem as 
they only use beliefs (Bykvist & Olson 2012, 5). However, it is not entirely clear that 
cognitivists can explain comparing moral and non-moral certitudes or, if one does not use 
logical truths which clearly merit certitude of 1 as Bykvist and Olson use, they even 
should be comparable. In fact, it could be argued that as Bykvist and Olson’s examples 
all use simple logical or mathematical truths, they fail to give a good general argument 
that certitude of all beliefs (moral or not) should be possible to be compared with each 
other. Consider for example the non-moral belief “it will rain tomorrow in Helsinki” and 
moral belief “helping people in need, regardless of their previous actions, is the right thing 
to do”. It might seem like a potential for fieldwork studies, investigating if people do see 
comparing their certitude of these type of questions intuitive. Until better argument then 
just stating intuitions is provided, it seems safe to assume that solving normalisation 
problem would also enable cross-attitudinal comparison, as then both moral and non-
moral beliefs will get a number on a comparable scale. Even if the comparison between 
those two beliefs is not intuitive, it can be made. 
 
The problem of normalisation is most clearly a problem for a pure expressivist. It also 
turns out that both Ridge and Lenman, despite going hybrid, will have to deal with the 
issues identified, albeit in a critically different ways. For Ridge, the problem is similar to 
the one a pure expressivist faces, even though he included a descriptive belief in his 
account. Ridge described certitude as consisting of both belief and desire-like 
components strengths. When adding the strength of the non-cognitive, desire-like 
component to the mix of certitude Ridge seems to lose the account of what it means for 
the certitude to be 1, thus making the comparison of cross-attitudinal states unclear 
(Bykvist & Olson 2009, 212). Adding a desire-like state of mind to the mix loses the 
simple meaning of full certitude. 
 
If the desire-like attitude seems to cause the problems, then would it be possible to drop 
it and explain certitude with only the belief part of the hybrid account? This route is the 
one Lenman takes. According to Lenman, the certitude of a moral judgement is simply 
the certitude of the belief that the subject’s ideal advisor would endorse the judgement 
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(Lenman 2003). Bykvist and Olson, however, point out that that is purely certitude of a 
descriptive belief and does not catch any moral certainty (Bykvist & Olson 2009, 210). 
As the description of an ideal agent is necessarily a descriptive one, we could have a 
situation where we are uncertain of which ideal advisor to follow. In other words, the 
question remains that is anything that a particular ideal advisor endorses actually good. 
This uncertainty is not captured by just having uncertainty on whether an ideal agent 
would endorse something. It seems that expressivists definition of certitude must involve 
the desire-like component as well to correctly capture moral certainty, with all the 
problems explained above.  
 
The second problem that Bykvist and Olson discuss is directed only to Ridge’s account. 
Remember that Ridge’s account of certitude consisted of the strength of a subject's belief 
that an ideal advisor would recommend the judgement and from the strength of her pro-
attitude for that advisor’s recommendations. According to Ridge, this desire-like pro-
attitude is relative to the subject’s other desires, in order to account for motivational 
maladies. If an agent suffers depression and all her desires weaken, it should not lower 
her degree of confidence for moral judgements. Even though depression will affect the 
motivation to act according to the judgement, it does not make her less sure that it is true. 
Thus, the strength of the endorsement is always relative to her other desires (Ridge 2007, 
72). In other words: if the strength of the desire is normalised as a number, it will stay the 
same if all the agent's desires are weakened by the same degree. Unfortunately, Bykvist 
and Olson show that this method of normalisation leads to severe problems. If the desire-
like pro-attitudes strength is measured relative to other desires, then it follows that if the 
strength of another desire increases and the agent's strength in desiring actions her ideal 
advisor would recommend remains the same, her certitude in moral judgements decreases 
(Bykvist & Olson 2009, 214). In practice this effect would mean, for example, that if the 
agent's desire for an ice cream cone increases, her moral certitude will decrease. This is 
manifestly an absurd outcome.  
 
To summarise the critique made by Bykvist and Olson is that hybrid expressivism faces 
a dilemma. On the one hand, if certitude is accounted only by the belief component of the 
moral judgement, then it cannot capture moral uncertainty, only empirical uncertainty. 
On the other hand, including the desire-like component as part of the certitude equation 
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faces the problem that either motivational maladies, like depression, will decrease an 
agent's moral certitude or that the agent's moral certitude can change depending on 
changes on her other desires. In addition to these problems, Bykvist and Olson demand 
more explanation of how the cross-attitudinal comparison can make sense if moral 
judgements and descriptive beliefs are different kinds of attitudes and the normalisation 
of them uses different scales. Just modifying Smith’s proposal to an expressivist-friendly 
format does not work, so in the next section we will look for different ways to understand 
credences of moral judgements.  
 
4.4 Structuring Pure Expressivism 
 
Based on the criticism encountered in the last section, Andrew Sepielli (2011) suggested 
that hybrid expressivists are in the same boat as pure expressivists: both have similar 
troubles in explaining credences. Going hybrid did not give any benefits, so it seems that 
focusing only on the explanation pure expressivism should give could be beneficial. 
Sepielli argues that any form of expressivism that has enough structure to solve the 
infamous Frege-Geach problem will solve Smith’s challenge as well (Sepielli 2011, 191). 
In this section will be briefly explained Sepielli’s view, before moving on to the inevitable 
counterarguments it has encountered from Bykvist and Olson.  
 
Sepielli takes the Frege-Geach problem to be primarily a question of the complexity of 
semantics: while moral language is very complex, non-cognitivist rendering of moral 
thought is not (Sepielli 2011, 196). Now the problem is trying to explain the first with the 
second; reducing the complexities of language to non-cognitive states is facing severe 
problems. One of the best examples of this is the Unwin’s (1999) question of negation. 
Cognitivist can explain the inconsistency of “x is good” and “x is not good” by relying on 
the meaning of the concept of “not” and the logical relation of the beliefs expressed by 
the sentences. Expressivists cannot appeal to the logical relation of beliefs, as she holds 
that they are not beliefs (or at least not the same kind of beliefs). If she instead states that 
there exists non-cognitive state of “favouring” that takes place instead of a belief, she 
could say that “x is right” expresses the attitude of “favouring x” and “x is not right” 
expresses the attitude of “favouring not x” (Sepielli 2011, 197). However, as Unwin 
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(1999) explained, this is not good enough. There exist two different negations of the 
sentence “x is right”: “x is not right” and “not x is right”. The attitude of “favouring not x” 
seems to correlate to the latter, not on the previous as it should be. Critically it seems like 
the sentences “x is right” and “not x is right” might not be inconsistent, at least if the word 
“right” is replaced or equated with “permitted” (Sepielli 2011, 197). 
     
While Sepielli highlights different possible options to reply to this challenge, he 
ultimately picks the one that Mark Schroeder has drafted in his book “Being For” (2008). 
In the book Schroeder argues for adding complexity to the non-cognitive state expressed 
by moral thought. Instead of having an attitude towards something, we have an attitude 
towards having some relation to that thing (Sepielli 2011, 198). An example will help 
explain the concept. In simpler expressivism, “murder is wrong” expresses a non-
cognitive attitude against murder, like blaming or not-favouring. Now this more 
complicated version asserts a non-cognitive attitude of “being for” so that in the previous 
example “wrong” corresponds to being for “blaming for murder” (Schroeder 2008, 56). 
In this way the moral judgement “murder is wrong” expresses FOR(blaming for murder), 
“murder is not wrong” expresses FOR(not blaming for murder) and “not murdering is 
wrong” expresses FOR(not murdering). Adding complexity in this way will cleanly solve 
the problem Unwin highlighted as well as contribute to the solving of the Frege-Geach 
problem.  
     
Giving the expressivist’s moral judgement more structure enables answering Smith's 
challenge as well, or so Sepielli argues. He suggests that degrees of Being For (as 
explained by Schroeder) are comparable to degrees of belief of cognitive beliefs (Sepielli 
2011, 199). Certitude is about the "outer-structure", and the importance can be assigned 
in the "inner-structure" of the judgement: being very sure that murder is very wrong 
would be "being very FOR(strongly blaming murder)". Why in this order? It is because 
the "inner-structure" must encompass the gradable feature of moral judgement. "It is 
better to lie to avoid causing anxiety than to always speak the truth" is to grade "lying for 
a good cause" more important than "speak truth" and the corresponding non-cognitive 
state would be "being FOR(preferring "lying for a good cause" to "always speaking 
truth")". The main idea Sepielli is promoting here is that the Frege-Geach problem is 
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about accommodating two different content in the expressivist picture of moral 
judgement: beliefs and logical concepts. Now the suggestion is that any expressivist view 
that can solve the Frege-Geach problem should be able to use the same resources to solve 
Smiths challenge. 
     
Recall from the last section that the problem of normalisation was one of the critical issues 
plaguing expressivist accounts using non-cognitive attitude to explain degrees of belief. 
Normalisation of credences was mainly needed for cross-attitudinal comparison as well 
as accommodating some intuitive, logical behaviour of credences. As Bykvist and Olson 
identified, the main problem for normalisation of non-cognitive states of minds seems to 
be about finding the maximum, i.e. what correlates with the degree of 1 (Bykvist&Olson 
2008, 212). Sepielli (2011, 203) proposes to normalise the Being For with the following 
account:  
  
NORMALISED BEING FOR: For(X) = 1, where X is a universal set whose members are 
all possible relations an agent might bear to an action.  
 
The above formulation declares that if an agent is For something, the maximum amount 
she can be is 1. Sepielli points out that the issue is more about whether we take this non-
cognitive states to be normalised, not if it actually is normalised in a strictly metaphysical 
sense (Sepielli 2011, 203). In other words, Sepielli is not giving out an explanation of 
what does it mean to be for something to the degree of 1, but is saying that just by “fixing” 
the maximum at 1 and making credences obey the laws of probability theory, we can 
explain how surface-level moral language and our intuitions work. 
 
4.5 Problems of The Being For Account 
 
As with the other attempts, Krister Bykvist and Jonas Olson have published a set of 
criticism showing where Sepielli’s work falls short. Sepielli claimed that as hybrid 
versions of expressivism do not gain any benefits compared to a version of expressivism 
using only non-cognitive state of mind. As such, he focused on explaining certitude from 
a pure expressivists point of view. Unfortunately for him, Bykvist and Olson show that 
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the problems they showed plaguing a hybrid version are still present in Sepielli’s account, 
with the addition of some new issues.   
 
When recounting Ridge's version of certitude, we found out that if the certitude of a moral 
judgement is tied to a non-cognitive state of mind, then motivational maladies will be a 
problem. Being in a state of depression lowers an agent's motivational attitudes. Sepielli 
explicitly poses Being For to be inherently motivating, and so it falls prey to motivational 
maladies (Sepielli 2011, 200). The problem is that if having a high certitude that "x is 
good" is represented as "being very FOR(x)", the certitude in that moral judgement is 
lowered if you are depressed. As earlier, this seems wrong, or at least it is not clear why 
this would happen. Having depression does not reduce an agent's certitude that "2+2=4", 
so the gut reaction is that it should not lower our certitude that "x is good" either (Bykvist 
& Olson 2012, 4). No progress is made here by Sepielli. 
 
What about the cross-attitudinal comparison, which Bykvist and Olson previously 
identified as a major problem? After all, Sepielli offers an answer to the normalisation. 
His idea rests on solving the issue of what does it mean for desire-like attitude to be at its 
maximum level. As explained in the last section, the idea is to declare that the maximum 
level of Being For is reached when considering all the possible relations an agent could 
have with some proposition. This simply fixes the maximum level theoretically to enable 
normalisation. Bykvist and Olson argue this theoretical fixing creates an awkward 
problem.  
 
The problem rests on the notion that according to Sepielli’s explanation, the tautological 
judgement “blaming for A or not blaming for A” must have credence to the degree of 1 
(Bykvist & Olson 2012, 6). Now as non-cognitivists hold that moral judgements are 
action-guiding and inherently motivating, the question is that what is an agent motivated 
to do when she judges “blame A or not blame A”? It would seem that she would be for a 
tautological act, which seems somewhat odd. As Bykvist and Olson point out, being for 
a tautological act would mean that she would be guided to either disregard the whole issue 
of A or not be motivated to do anything (Bykvist & Olson 2012, 6). After all, what could 
you do that would be based on a tautology? This is an unfortunate result, especially when 
if she seems to be less than fully certain about “blaming for A”. If she is firmly, but less 
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than fully, FOR(blaming for A) it means that she is more FOR(blaming for A or not 
blaming for A). Being most for a tautology would implicate that she is either motivated 
to disregard A or do nothing. This is absurd, as now the agent should be less motivated 
for doing acts according to “blaming for A” than doing nothing, while still being firmly 
for blaming for A. Another way Bykvist and Olson illustrate the worry is by referencing 
preferences. A preference logic principle says that if A is weakly preferred to not-A, then 
A is weakly preferred to (A or not-A), which is in turn weakly preferred to not-A (Bykvist 
& Olson 2012, 7). In other words, the worry is that it seems like moral judgements have 
no motivational force, and that is exceptionally bad for non-cognitivists.  
 
Sepielli’s account aims to explain how pure expressivism can have enough structure for 
both certitude and importance, but it does not succeed in its goals. The same problems 
that Bykvist and Olson identified earlier still exist. If explaining certitude as a feature of 
the non-cognitive state-of-mind seems to be difficult, could expressivists try to take the 
matter out of the moral judgement itself and explain the issue as something else? Next 
section will introduce an attempt to do just that. 
 
4.6 Classificatory Account of Certitude 
 
As we saw, Sepielli did not manage to solve the problems that are due to the credence 
being described as a feature of a non-cognitive state-of-mind. John Eriksson and Ragnar 
Francén Olinder think these are valid problems and thus they try something else. They 
take the road Jimmy Lenman took and try to account for certitude fully in terms of a 
cognitive belief. In contrast to Lenman, they argue that their account can be used by pure 
expressivists as well, not just hybrid expressivists. The main idea is that the uncertainty 
of a moral belief should be linked to the psychology behind uncertainty and how that 
necessarily introduces a belief component to the equation (Eriksson & Francén Olinder 
2016, 719). 
  
So what is the psychology behind uncertainty? To explore that question, Eriksson and 
Francén Olinder make a foray into what they call classificatory uncertainty. We all have 
dispositions to group things together in our mind, for example labelling various furniture 
items as chairs. After the class of chair has been established, we can start applying it to 
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the objects we see around us. However, we might also be uncertain whether some item 
actually is a chair, even if we know all the characteristics of the item in question. As 
Eriksson and Francén Olinder explain, we might be uncertain if the back of the chair is 
big enough to be classified as a chair instead of a stool, even if we are aware of all the 
actual measurements (Eriksson & Francén Olinder 2016, 725). According to Eriksson 
and Francén Olinder, this is being fundamentally chair-uncertain, and they argue that 
purely moral uncertainty is analogous to classificatory uncertainty (Eriksson & Francén 
Olinder 2016, 725). 
 
Eriksson and Francén Olinder explain that there are, in fact, more than one way one can 
be morally uncertain. Two fundamental types identified are:  
 
(1) Uncertainty what the standard in question says about the situation, or 
indeterminacy of the standard.  
(2) Uncertainty about the content of the standard itself. 
 
The first type of uncertainty can be easily highlighted with the case of “is the Pope a 
bachelor?”. In this case you might have indeterminate standards of what counts as a 
bachelor, and thus you face the uncertainty of whether to count the Pope as a bachelor or 
not. This indeterminacy can also result in faster and slower cases of deciding whether 
something is falls under a classification. In the previous case you might, in the end, 
classify the Pope as a bachelor, but it is not as immediate and clear as classifying a regular, 
non-clerical unmarried man as a bachelor. In other words, there are degrees of centrality 
to the standard. (Eriksson & Francén Olinder 2016, 725-726). 
 
Eriksson and Francén Olinder say that our moral standards are opaque. While we do have 
the matching disposition to apply them to the world, we very often are not able to give a 
full analysis of the concept in question. We are also fallible beings, so we might, for 
example, be under the influence of distorting facts or be guilty of wishful thinking.  This 
is the second type of uncertainty. The uncertainty about a moral belief can be a doubt that 
the belief in question has been thought out in all possible scenarios and that it would be 
found true in all those scenarios, or that it can be uncertainty about our own mental 
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capabilities and dispositions when making the judgement. (Eriksson & Francén Olinder 
2016, 726-727). 
 
The second type of uncertainty looks like the uncertainty of descriptive type, rather than 
uncertainty of moral matters. Eriksson and Francén Olinder, however, argue that the 
comparison of moral and descriptive uncertainty is a false dichotomy, and rather we 
should investigate derived and non-derived moral uncertainty (Eriksson & Francén 
Olinder 2016, 728). The derived uncertainty is where we are uncertain if an act has the 
properties that we label as wrong-making, and the underived uncertainty deals with the 
question of whether those properties correctly label an act as wrong, according to our 
standards (Eriksson & Francén Olinder 2016, 728).  
 
Now the one thing that is glaringly missing from the two uncertainties is the case where 
the agent is uncertain of whether her classifications are correct. Wondering about the 
classifications themselves is not similar to the uncertainties discussed above, as she is not 
actually uncertain about whether the standard applies here, or whether the specific 
standard has been appropriately investigated. Instead she is questioning if she even can 
make true judgements. She is fundamentally uncertain about her general ability to get any 
standards right. Here Eriksson and Francén Olinder make a novel suggestion. To doubt 
her standards means that the agent has a belief that her moral beliefs misrepresent the 
world (Eriksson & Francén Olinder 2016, 730). She is, in effect, projecting moral 
standards to the world and acts as if there are objective moral properties which her moral 
standards should reflect. Thus, doubting a moral standard is to be worried that that 
standard is not correctly representing the world, and we can see that standard in the world 
only because we are projecting them as features of the real world. This means that to 
doubt that a moral standard does not correctly represent the world is to have a false belief 
that it even can represent the world in any way (Eriksson & Francén Olinder 2016, 730). 
To be uncertain about moral standards is relevantly different from being uncertain 
whether the standard applies to this situation or whether the standard applies in all cases.  
 
To recap, according to Eriksson and Francén Olinder uncertainty of a belief is akin to 
classificatory uncertainty, except in the case where the subject believes that her moral 
belief might misrepresent the world. In all other cases, the uncertainty boils down to either 
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being uncertain that the moral standard in question applies to the situation or uncertainty 
about how determined the standard is. This reduction enables Eriksson and Francén 
Olinder to disattach uncertainty from the moral belief itself: uncertainty is not a feature 
of the moral belief, but a feature of the necessarily accompanying descriptive belief 
(Eriksson & Francén Olinder 2016, 731-732). With this separation, Eriksson and Francén 
Olinder disagree with Michael Smith’s thought of what credences are, which is the basis 
of his original argument dealt with in the section 4.1. 
 
4.7 Problems with the Classificatory Account of Certitude 
 
Eriksson and Francén Olinder use the Lenman route of argumentation, by relying on a 
descriptive belief to provide the certitude of moral judgements. If we now recall the 
principal objection that Bykvist and Olson used against Lenman, it comes clear that 
Eriksson and Francén Olinder have not yet fully solved the problem. The problem with 
relying on a descriptive belief (that accompanies a moral judgment) to provide the 
certitude is that the uncertainty is then about that descriptive belief, not about moral 
matters. The classificatory account of uncertainty seems to focus on whether the object 
of the moral judgement has a property, or qualifies as having a property, which an agent's 
moral standard ascribes to it. As Bykvist and Olson note, this does not give a general 
account of uncertainty, as the agent can be certain that the object of her judgement has 
the property her standard ascribes as either right-making or wrong-making, and still be 
uncertain whether the standard itself is correct (Bykvist & Olson 2017, 729) 
 
As explained, to account for the uncertainty of an agent about whether her own moral 
beliefs are correct, Eriksson and Francén Olinder have the novel idea that in this case, she 
has a (false) belief about her moral beliefs. The idea is a novel one as it explains that 
doubting all of your own moral beliefs is actually a separate belief, not even necessarily 
defined as a feature of the moral belief. It is also striking how similar this is to the proposal 
made by Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons, explained in section 3.4. While Horgan and 
Timmons claimed that admitting that your stable moral judgements could be wrong is 
actually stating a metaethical opinion about realist-type moral facts, Eriksson and Francén 
Olinder just straight out answer that even if you state this type of opinion, it is a false 




Bykvist and Olson also note that this belief is a metaethical belief, which, according to 
non-cognitivism, is a false one (Bykvist & Olson 2017, 730). Bykvist and Olson point 
out that it is certainly possible to make moral judgements without thinking metaethical 
questions of whether our judgements are beliefs and whether those correctly represent the 
objective moral facts (Bykvist & Olson 2017, 4). The projectivist belief is not necessarily 
accompanying the moral judgment, and so they conclude that requiring a metaethical 
belief cannot be the correct answer. 
 
While that above is undoubtedly true, it is not such a big deal. Having doubts about your 
moral beliefs is also something which does not necessarily accompany those beliefs. 
Those doubts, or certainty if that is the case, can arguably only materialise once you think 
about it. If that is the case, then it might be that the metaethical belief, which Eriksson 
and Francén Olinder argued for, is actually formed at the very moment the certitude of a 
moral belief is thought about. The bigger problem seems to be facing non-cognitivists 
themselves. If you are a committed non-cognitivist and realise that doubting your own 
moral beliefs means having a false belief, you should drop that belief (Bykvist & Olson 
2017, 730). In that case you will be dropping any and all quasi-realist inclinations, as you 
then must abandon any possibility to doubt your moral beliefs in all but descriptive sense. 
 
Even if this can be remedied, all is not solved. As with Horgan and Timmons, it is not 
entirely clear that the question can be transferred to the realm of metaethics. The main 
problem still seems to be that a belief about moral beliefs does not really answer how 
those moral beliefs have credences (Bykvist & Olson 2017, 730). Even while the 
(descriptive) belief about our own moral judgements does have a credence, how should 
that apply to the moral belief system, which is its subject? It is not clear how this should 
function. As with Horgan and Timmons earlier, moving the question to the realm of 
metaethics seems a potential way forward, but as it stands it does not have the explanatory 
power it claims. If not properly addressed, the classificatory account seems to apply only 
in the situations where the actual, fundamental moral belief is not questioned. 
 
As the discussion so far shows, the problem of certitude as it has been formulated seems 
to be a serious one for all non-cognitivists, expressivists and quasi-realists included, and 
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has close linkage to the question of doubting our stable moral judgements. While the 
traditional epistemological account of belief deals in binaries, the idea that belief, in 
reality, comes in varying degrees seems common-sensical. As a common-sensical idea 
prevalent in common thought and speak, it is something that quasi-realists needs to be 
able to include in their analysis of moral belief. As Bykvist and Olson further clarified, 
moral beliefs should have a degree of belief in the same scale as descriptive beliefs, 
arguing that otherwise, the comparison between the two is difficult to make sense of 
(Bykvist & Olson 2008, 212). 
 
This thesis started with exploring the problem Andy Egan set with pointing out that 
expressivist explanation of uncertainty seemed to encounter problems when the 
uncertainty is about a stable moral belief (Egan 2007). According to Egan’s 
argumentation, it seems that expressivist would need to admit that there is an asymmetry 
between our stable beliefs and other people’s stable beliefs. That is, we can doubt 
everyone else’s stable beliefs, but not our own. This asymmetry, in turn, seems to run 
afoul of quasi-realists commitment to common moral thought. Michael Ridge identified 
that when dealing with uncertainty and with judgements of stability, understanding 
certitude plays a big part (Ridge 2015). Unfortunately, Ridge did not successfully solve 
the problem Egan proposed. The critical issue is still located in understanding what does 
a judgement of stability and uncertainty in a moral belief means. To determine whether 
we even should be able to doubt our stable judgements, we first need to understand what 
credences mean. Unfortunately for expressivists, Michael Smith showed that 
understanding how credences work in non-cognitivist explanation of moral judgment is 
difficult (Smith 2002). In answering all the attempts to provide answers to Smith’s 
challenge, Bykvist and Olson have specified that one of the major problems seems to be 
explaining what full certitude means. If a desire-like component is part of the moral 
judgement, what does it mean to have a full certitude is not entirely clear. Desires do not, 
after all, seem to have a maximum natural level. Making sense of a belief, moral or non-
moral, with full certitude seems to be paramount in understanding stable beliefs in Egan’s 
challenge as well. Without being able to explain how certitude can be a part of the moral 
judgement so that it can be normalised, quasi-realists cannot adequately answer either of 




That is if you play by the rules that Smith set. The foundation of Smith’s challenge is 
based on the understanding that certitude as is an integral part of the belief itself and 
cognitivists do not have any problems to explain certitude. Michael Ridge has recently 
argued (2018b), this supposition is highly problematic. Example Smith gave in explaining 
certitude relied on tracking betting behaviour of an individual, which seems to be the 
orthodox view on certitude. The whole idea of certitude as akin to betting behaviour 
heavily relies on, or at least leads into, a philosophical position of Bayesianism or 





5 DEGREES OF BELIEF 
 
5.1 Bayesianism and the Dutch Book Argument 
 
It is a borderline platitude that opinions and beliefs come in degrees. We only need to 
look into the profitable industry of sports betting to see it in action. Or more mundanely, 
one can initiate a discussion with anyone about tomorrows weather and whether it will 
rain or not. There exists a myriad of options between “it will definitely rain” and “it will 
definitely not rain”. As seen from the discussion in the previous chapter, it is common to 
describe the degrees of belief as betting behaviour. This section explores why this is the 
case. 
  
The current orthodoxy on degrees of belief, or credences, rely on either full Bayesianism 
or the reduced concept of probabilism. Instead of being a single idea and theory, 
Bayesianism is a collection of ideas and positions dealing with, for example, questions in 
confirmation theory and epistemology. While there is no unified Bayesian theory or 
position, there are some keystones that most Bayesians agree upon. Kenny Easwaran 
(2011a, 312) describes them thus: 
 
(1) There is an important mental attitude of a degree of belief or credence that can 
(often) be given numerical values.  
(2) For an agent to be perfectly rational, her degrees of belief must obey the axioms 
of probability theory.  
(3) Conditionalisation, or some close relative, is the standard way beliefs change 
over time.  
 
Point 3 is sometimes left out of the commitments, but then the view is simply called 
probabilism. For the problem outlined in the previous section, only points 1 and 2 need 
apply, so the term “probabilism” is used in this thesis. However, as Bayenianism 
incorporates probabilism in it, the terms can be used interchangeably in the discussion 
which follows. The first point, arguably the fundamental point in probabilism, is similar 
to what is described in the previous chapter when Smith’s challenge to expressivism was 
discussed. Namely that even while a subject can have two (or more) beliefs 
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simultaneously, her confidence in them can be different and that the confidence on a 
single belief can be given a numerical value. As we recall, this seemed to be the key 
problem facing expressivists, as it is not clear if non-cognitive states of mind can be given 
numerical values similar to descriptive beliefs.  
  
The second point making the boundaries on agent’s rationality uses axioms of probability 
theorem but does not fix exactly which axioms. There exists some variation of which 
axioms should be used, but that does not matter to the present discussion. In short, the 
idea is to enable comparisons, additions, unions and similar logical operations between 
different degrees of belief. Now, one of the main arguments for the probabilism, called 
the Dutch book argument, illustrates this point the best. The Dutch book argument also 
contains a betting situation, but a more complex and more strictly defined than discussed 
in the previous chapter.  
 
In the Dutch book it is assumed, that for every proposition, there exists a price which the 
subject is willing to pay for a bet that pays one euro (1€) if the proposition is true. Also, 
this price is considered fair by the subject, meaning that she is willing to buy the bet if 
offered a lower price and sell it if offered a more significant price. The Dutch book 
argument consists of a series of bets made against a bookie with one more major 
assumption made: the buying behaviour of the subject making the bets is not affected by 
any previous transactions. With these assumption made, it can be proven that if the prices 
the subject accepts do not follow axioms of probability theory, the subject is guaranteed 
a loss. In other words, in a series of bet transactions, if the subject makes decisions which 
break axioms of probability theory, she will lose money even if the decisions are 
otherwise rational at the point they were made. The proof is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, but it is sufficient to say that it has been taken to show that only bets that satisfy 
the axioms of probability theorem are rational, as stated by the second point above. (f.e. 
Easwaran 2011a, 315.) 
  
The Dutch book is obviously theoretical device not meant to be taken literally. Despite 
the theoretical background, it has been argued that if a subject would have a fair bet price 
in her mind and if this price would be determined solely by her degree of belief to that 
proposition, this price would give us numerical values to her degree of belief (Easwaran 
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2011a, 315). Explained like this, betting behaviour is close to what Smith described as 
certitude of a subject. If theoretical bets would give us singular numerical values for 
degrees of belief that would neatly guarantee easy device for comparing certitudes of 
different beliefs, even beliefs made at different times. For this reason, being able to track 
this type of betting behaviour would be a good goal for expressivists to pursue in order 
to solve one of the bigger problems pointed out by Bykvist and Olson. There are, 
however, many problems with the Dutch book argument and paralleling degrees of belief 
with betting behaviour, as highlighted by Lina Erikson and Alan Hájek (2007). These 
problems will be explained in the next section.  
 
5.2 Credences as Betting Behaviour 
 
As we saw in the last section, maybe the most significant argument for probabilism, the 
Dutch book argument, loosely linked degrees of belief with betting behaviour. It seems 
clear that there are two different ways to understand this linking. Either an agent's degree 
of belief in an outcome of a belief is defined by what she would bet (in a suitable betting 
situation) for that outcome, or the degree of belief is measured by how she would bet in 
that situation. There are problems with both approaches.  
 
First and foremost, it is not viable for the actual, real-world betting behaviour to define 
degrees of belief. We do not always bet according to our beliefs. Consider for example a 
football team fan who bets according to his loyalties, or a puritan who refuses to bet 
altogether and thus would have a certitude of 0 for all beliefs (Erikson & Hájek 2007, 
187). Erikson & Hájek (2007, 188) also raise a good point about actual betting situations 
not really obeying the basic closure conditions of probabilities: we do not bet on a 
disjunction or conjunction of different betting situations, like an outcome of a horse race 
and an outcome of a lottery.  
 
For these reasons the betting situation is usually considered hypothetical and the betting 
subject idealised. Idealisation is, however, a tricky tool and seems a bit ad-hoc. There are 
worries that anything can be said with an “idealised” version of a situation and that 
idealisation loses the connection with the real world (Erikson & Hájek 2007, 189). Even 
if the worry about idealisation would be put aside, the betting interpretation also seems 
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to be circular. Betting on some proposition, like the outcome of a horse race, does not just 
depend on an agent's credences of the proposition “horse X will win”. It also rests on her 
credences about other propositions: what the bets are, how the race is going to be 
conducted, what are its rules, is betting allowed by God, and similar beliefs (Erikson & 
Hájek 2007, 188). To say that a degree of belief is defined by betting behaviour is thus at 
least heavily suspect.  
     
What about measuring degrees of beliefs by betting behaviour? Similar problems rise 
here as well. First of all, the same football fan and puritan examples suffice to illustrate 
that the measurement cannot be direct in this case either, but rather an idealisation. More 
importantly, placing bets changes the world and possibly credences as well (Erikson & 
Hájek 2007, 191-192). These changes are the key reason the Dutch book argument 
presupposes that previous or future bets do not affect future bets. Otherwise the subject 
would see the Dutch book coming and reject it, even while the individual bets would be 
acceptable. In the real world this assumption is problematic: an agent should be able to 
change her credences if the world changes (Erikson & Hájek 2007, 192). Moreover, there 
are instances where incoherent betting behaviour is the winning strategy, which clearly 
gives problems for probabilism (see f.e. Erikson & Hájek 2007, 193). 
 
Regardless whether degrees of belief are defined by betting behaviour, or whether they 
should just be measured by it, stating that credence on a proposition should have a single 
numerical value has additional problems. First of all, demanding a single and specific 
value instead of a range of possibilities seems to run counter to our intuitions on some 
cases. As Jonathan Roorda argues, demanding commitment to a single value of fair odds 
to something like political election results seems unduly harsh (Roorda 1995, 15). For 
example, even if all the facts were known to me, and I would be an idealisation of myself 
as a fully informed, fully rational and without any possible failures of mind, I suppose I 
would allow myself to accept a variety of odds as fair if forced to bet on the number of 
seats any of the parties will win in the next Finnish general elections. If in a betting 





What's more, it seems like not all beliefs can be even tracked with betting behaviour. 
Namely, if I have an unprovable proposition on my hands constructing a betting situation 
seems exceedingly hard. As an example, I might be rather certain that no aliens will be 
discovered during my lifetime. However, I would be unwilling to bet anything on that as 
the proposition can only be discovered true or false after I have died, making the betting 
a moot point for me. Using only monetary rewards to find out betting odds is not going 
to work in these situations. These types of unprovable propositions, or at least beliefs in 
propositions where constructing a viable betting situation is hard, are crucial for the main 
interest in this thesis. After all, most philosophical theories seem to fall into this category. 
A betting situation to find out credences on the proposition "rule-consequentialism is the 
correct theory" seems to be rather hard to imagine. Creating a fair betting situation for 
philosophical propositions, which might not have unambiguously true or false outcomes, 
is a somewhat foolish task. 
 
However, understanding betting as purely monetary or similar exchange might be too 
narrow. Instead of talking about financial benefits and actual betting situation, which has 
already been exposed as problematic, the betting situation can be understood as a broader 
concept. Frank Ramsey proposed in his 1926 article "Truth and Probability" that betting 
should be understood to be linked to the choices one makes in life. Every decision you 
make has an expected utility, which, together with your degree of belief, can be used to 
calculate the most rational choice from a myriad of options. If option A has a utility of 50 
and you believe it to the degree of 0.8, and option B has a utility of 20 with a degree of 
belief being only 0.6, choosing option A would clearly maximise your expected utility. 
Ramsey used as an example a real-life situation of being in a crossroad. To measure the 
degree of belief I have in that one of the roads is the one I should take, one can measure 
the physical distance I would be willing to travel in order to find the correct answer 
(Ramsay 1926, 174). The betting situation can be interpreted in this way as a situation 
where an agent is willing to risk something she values on the truth of the proposition in 
the question, which would lead to a payoff of something else she values (see f.e. Ridge 
2018b). The goal is to find the relative value of the payoff versus the risked value, and 




Unfortunately, this does not solve the problems that have been discussed about singular 
values, or the problem of unprovable propositions. For example, taking the previous 
example of betting on the Finnish Parliamentary elections, it can be imagined that the 
agent can still accept a variety of subjective payoffs as fair, manifested in her behaviour 
on issues that have a connection to the election. The broader account of betting does not 
explain the problem away; moreover, it could even be seen as expanding the possible 
behaviours of an agent thus giving even more leeway into what subjective probabilities 
could be counted as fair by the agent in question.  
 
As for the proposition where monetary betting situations and rules are hard to define, the 
broader account might succeed in explaining bets on philosophical theories. Depending 
on which theory you subscribe to, you can choose to act according to that belief. Acts in 
this sense can be understood as acting according to the certainty that some theory is 
correct, or at least defensible, like writing a master thesis that argues for that theory. In 
spite of vindicating philosophical theories, the "no aliens discovered" statement proves 
still to be problematic. The problem is to pinpoint what actions would actually be affected 
by that belief. If none, then the subjective probability would be left undiscovered or 
undefined, which is an unviable solution. Even if "no aliens discovered" statement would 
not affect my actions in the least, I should still be able to have a degree of belief on it.  
 
It seems like betting behaviour and credences are irrevocably different. The betting 
behaviour might supervene on credence, but it is by no means an explanation of what 
credence actually is or even provide a useful measurement tool for what credence in some 
situation might be. At most, betting behaviour might indicate in some narrow and specific 
situations what the value of a credence is, but it offers no metaphysical explanation. 
 
What the degree of belief actually is seems to be exceedingly hard to define. While there 
have been other attempts besides tracking it with betting behaviour, they are all highly 
contested (see f.e. Erikson & Hájek 2007). There is a variance of confidence levels 
between various beliefs, as we can readily see, but the additional Bayesian complication 
of those confidences following probability calculus is mostly used as it is so convenient 
and seems to solve so many theoretical burdens (see Erikson & Hájek 2007, 210-211 and 
Easwaran 2011a, 318-319). Despite that, just “being useful” is a long way from a knock-
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down argument. As Erikson and Hájek note (2007, 210), we have a good common-sense 
understanding of the concept of certitude and so can provide a sentence describing what 
we actually do know about it:  
 
COMMON-SENSE CERTITUDE: It is the thing that should obey the probability 
calculus (and thus provides an interpretation of it), that is often but  not always measured 
by betting dispositions, that guides decision, that underpins  relations of confirmation 
between evidence and hypotheses, that is often revealed in verbal reports, and so on. 
(Erikson and Hájek 2007, 210) 
 
Just listing things in this way about certitude does not give us any real understanding of 
what it is, but does point us in the direction of what needs to be explained.  
 
As discussed, the betting behaviour seems like a useful, if not sufficiently explanatory, 
non-binding measurement of betting behaviour in some cases, but does not explain the 
metaphysics of certitude. In other words, giving a story about betting behaviour does not 
explain what certitude is. In regard to Smith’s challenge explained in section 4.1, it at 
least looks like certitude is not actually a simple structural component of belief. If this is 
so, and certitude is more akin to betting dispositions on some instances if not all, there 
does not inherently seem to be anything that realist can say that would pose trouble for 
quasi-realist. If realists are happy to go with an explanation which does not change how 
a belief should be understood and is an additional disposition to act in some situations in 
certain way, no quasi-realist should be demanded a more robust explanation. 
 
Quasi-realist is not, in spite of the above conclusion, free to claim access to the same 
resources as a conventional realist to solve the problems identified by Andy Egan and 
Michael Smith. The trouble comes from the question of how belief and credence are 
connected. Indeed, Michael Ridge (2018b) states that it might be the most relevant 
question for quasi-realists to solve. The linkage is interesting as well when thinking about 
what a stable belief is: when are credences and beliefs separate and how do they interact; 
is certain credences needed for something to count as a belief; what is the linkage between 
full belief, certitude and knowledge? These should all help in making sense about the 
question of what stable beliefs are and what does doubt mean. For these reasons, the 
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literature on the problem of dual epistemology is investigated in the next section as well 
as Ridge’s idea of what problems it might cause to quasi-realists. 
 
5.3 Problem of Dual Epistemology 
 
Besides the problem of explaining what degrees of belief actually is, there also exists 
another grave worry: how to make sense of the two epistemological models on the table. 
The traditional model deals in the questions of justification, knowledge and belief, where 
belief is understood as a binary notion of “you have it” or “you do not have it”. The 
degrees of belief model casts doubt on that understanding, as it supposes that belief is a 
more complicated thing. As the binary terminology of belief has been the default of 
traditional epistemologists and as such as has been the main target on most, if not all, 
quasi-realist accounts, it bears a closer look. To understand the relationship between these 
two models is crucial for understanding how the stable beliefs in Andy Egan’s problem 
are connected to understanding credences of moral beliefs. 
 
As recounted in Ridge (2018b, 20-22) and Easwaran (2011b, 327-329), there are three 
different possibilities to explain away the tension between credences and traditional 
notion of belief. These are  
  
(1) Belief is reduced to credence, i.e. belief does not exist as a separate state of 
mind. 
(2) Belief and credence co-exist as different states of mind. 
(3) Credences are part of the content of belief, and do not exist as a separate state 
of mind. 
 
The first possibility is that belief is an informal concept approximating graded credences 
and can be fully reduced to credences. According to this view using "belief", and possibly 
"knowledge", should be ceased and only credences should be used when discussing 
epistemological matters. To disregard almost all of the current epistemological discussion 
would, however, need strong evidence and counterexamples which do not seem to exist. 
If nothing more, belief as a concept seems to have a useful role in our daily discussions, 
and it should be explained what we are doing when we say we believe something. So, 
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dismissing the whole concept outright does not seem to be the right way. In light of this, 
it is sometimes argued that belief should only be reserved for cases where the credence is 
1, i.e. for situations where a proposition is fully believed to be true (Easwaran 2011b, 
327). The standard problem for this type of reasoning is that we seem to have beliefs on 
whole range of propositions we are not fully certain of, especially if the betting 
interpretation is expected to hold true even approximately (Moss 2018, 57-58).  
 
We should be able to believe in a proposition, even if we are not ready to bet everything 
we have on it being true. I would say that I do believe that my nearest supermarket has at 
least ten cartons of low-fat milk on its shelves, but I am not fully certain of this and would 
not bet absurd sums on it. It might be that I’m counting distances wrong and think of the 
wrong supermarket, or that it might temporarily be out of milk altogether. Still, it seems 
that I can sensibly say that I believe that “nearest supermarket has at least ten cartons of 
low-fat milk on its shelves”. If not, then the common-sense account of belief is relevantly 
different from this technical term and separating the two could use some extra 
justification. 
 
To account that there are more beliefs than just fully certain ones, a so-called Lockean 
thesis understands beliefs to have credence above some threshold t (Easwaran 2011b, 
328). For example, if the threshold is considered to be 0.9 and I have a credence of 0.98 
on a proposition “a new Swallow the Sun album will be released next year”, I will be 
counted as believing that album release timeline. Same goes with the milk example: I 
might not have credence of 1 on it, but I would still have high enough to be counted as 
believing it. The Lockean thesis seems a tempting way to combine credences and beliefs, 
but there are many problems associated with this type of thinking. While the seemingly 
arbitrary threshold could be a potential research project for some aspiring social scientist 
(what odds would people give to propositions they declare believing), there is a problem 
with it, called the lottery paradox. Given sufficiently many tickets on the lottery 
(specifically 1/(1-t) tickets on a lottery where a win is guaranteed, where t is the threshold 
of belief) you should believe that “this ticket is not the winning one” of all the tickets on 
play, while simultaneously believing that “one ticket is the winning one” (Easwaran 
2011b, 328). Inconsistency like this does not look good on the account. While it looks 
right to be extremely uncertain on the winning possibilities on any single ticket, thus 
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creating an incentive not to buy lottery tickets, it must be simultaneously acknowledged 
that one ticket must be the winning one.  
 
For these reasons, the Lockean threshold has been given other understandings and, for 
example, proposed to be context dependent. There are problems for these explanations as 
well. Notably, as Jacob Ross and Mark Schroeder (2014) have argued, treating everything 
as a computational system where all the relevant non-zero credence outcomes of an action 
need to be considered in order to calculate the expected utility of the action, and thus to 
determine the particular credences of a proposition and whether we believe it, seems like 
a stretch. It might be the idealisation of how we should think, but it is not a realistic 
description of our thought processes. Thus, Ross and Schroeder argue that belief is 
actually a heuristical commitment to treat propositions as true in our actions and thoughts, 
not a cognitive computation treating it merely as highly likely outcome (Ross & Schoeder 
2014, 266). Ross and Schoeder (2014) point out other problems as well for the Lockean 
position, such as that we can be wrong on our beliefs, and that reducing a belief to 
credence less than 1 means that we can always deny that we were wrong in our belief. 
Instead, we can say that we just thought it very probable, and thus were not wrong per se. 
This outcome does not look right, and so it practically undermines any theory which 
reduces belief to a mere probability calculus. (Ross & Schoeder 2014, 275.)  
 
Ross and Schroeder are effectively arguing for the second possibility of how beliefs and 
credences are linked: the duality of state of minds in play. On the one hand, we have 
credences which follow probabilistic calculus and manifest themselves in actions taken 
when taking agents preferences in count as well; on the other hand, we have a heuristic 
commitment on the truth of a proposition, known as outright belief (Ross & Schoeder 
2014, 286). Neither is reducible to the other, and both serve distinctly different purposes. 
Credences are as discussed by probabilist, but belief is treating the proposition as true in 
reasoning (Ross & Schoeder 2014, 264). In action, this hinges on the realisation that any 
action has potentially almost infinite number of possible outcomes, which we might not 
be able to dismiss. In order to do anything, an agent disregards most of the outcomes, 





According to Ross and Schoeder the agent is not required to treat something as true, thus 
differing significantly from all the Lockean theories discussed earlier. While she might 
act according to one of the possibilities, she might not treat it as true in her reasoning. To 
use a previous example, if I really would need several cartons of low-fat milk as soon as 
possible, I could go visit my nearest supermarket while simultaneously looking from the 
Google Maps where the next nearest supermarket is, just in case the supermarket really 
would not have low-fat milk. In this case, I would treat the proposition “nearest 
supermarket has at least ten cartons of low-fat milk on its shelves” as probable, but not 
true, and would not be counted as believing it. 
 
The third option to consider about the linkage between credences and belief is the 
opposite of the first one. So instead of reducing belief to credences and effectually stating 
that credence is the more fundamental state of mind, there is the possibility to deny that 
credences are separate from belief. As with the opposite account, just dismissing the other 
term is not that attractive option, as we do seem to have varying degrees of confidence in 
different propositions. Sarah Moss (2018) has recently argued that credences are not a 
structural part of a belief, but part of the content. While Moss’s main argument is that we 
can have probabilistic knowledge, i.e. knowledge on propositions like “the supermarket 
is probably on the left”, she also argues that belief is the only attitude or state of mind and 
credences should be understood as probabilistic content of beliefs (Moss 2018, 57). A 
new way of understanding credences is naturally interesting for the questions explored in 
this thesis. The idea is that the sentence “the supermarket is probably on the left” has as 
its content a set of probability spaces, which assign higher credence to the proposition 
“the supermarket is on the left” than on the proposition “the supermarket is not on the 
left”. Probability space is understood as a technical term, not used explicitly in thought 
or even consciously understood by agents making probabilistic judgements. To simplify 
Moss’s theory rather heavily, it can be understood to say that the proposition “I have 0.2 
credence on X” should be interpreted as a belief “X is 0.2 likely”, cutting credences out 
of the picture as separate things to be accounted for. 
 
While probabilistic content of a belief seems to suit utterances with words like 
“probably”, “maybe”, “certainly” and such, what about simple sentences without modal 
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content like “it is going to rain tomorrow”? These sentences still bear logical relations to 
sentences that do contain probabilistic wordings (Moss 2018, 54). For example, “it is 
going to rain tomorrow” is consistent with “it is probably going to rain tomorrow”, but 
not with “it is probably not going to rain tomorrow”. To account for this relation, Moss 
defines a simple sentence as a sentence that has as its content the set of probability spaces 
according to which the propositional content is certain (Moss 2018, 54).  
 
This move, however, is not enough. If we can utter a simple sentence only when we are 
entirely certain of its content, we would be using simple sentences a lot less than we in 
fact do. Moss recognises this and introduces the idea that there are two types of speech: 
loose and strict (Moss 2018, 59). Strict speech fixes the content of an assertion so that 
uttering “it is three o’clock” in a strict sense really means precisely three o’clock, not a 
minute more or less. Loose speech of the same assertion, however, can be understood to 
be compatible with various times close enough to three o’clock. Moss claims that the 
same concept applies to belief so that we have both strict and loose beliefs about 
propositions. In effect, this would mean that simple strict belief is something we are fully 
certain of, and simple loose beliefs are analogous of having content with probability 
spaces which are not fully certain. In both cases, we still treat the simple belief as “close 
enough” to be certain for all practical purposes.  
 
In this way, Moss’s idea is close to Ross’s and Schroeder's suggestion of treating a 
proposition as true in reasoning even if it is not certain. Both recognise the problem of 
equating (full) belief with full certainty in our practical lives and propose that in real life 
we have “practical” beliefs on less-than-certain propositions, which we still treat as 
certain in our actions. For Ross and Schroeder, those are there to guide our actions while 
Moss concentrates on their less-precise nature, but the end result is the same. Uttering a 
simple sentence with loose content is expressing a belief, which guides our actions but 
can be questioned. 
 
In summary, of the three options of how probabilistic understanding of belief and the 
traditional binary epistemology are connected, it seems like only two options are viable. 
Reducing beliefs to certitude has serious problems, which both Ross and Schroeder’s and 
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Moss’s managed to divert. Michael Ridge claims that this is critically important for quasi-
realist. Ridge suggests, rather heavily, that quasi-realism just is a theory about what binary 
moral belief is (Ridge 2018b, 21). To conclude this, he draws especially from Allan 
Gibbard’s theory, which discusses moral judgements as plans to settle what to do, as well 
as his own theory using normative perspectives, which also settles things to do. Ridge 
compares them with Ross and Schroeder’s idea of treating propositions as true and 
concludes that this is a fully expressivist-friendly way of thinking (Ridge 2018b, 21). In 
contrast, dismissing binary belief altogether would get quasi-realist in trouble. This is 
because credences are not fundamental building blocks in quasi-realist theories in the 
same way that beliefs are. Ridge sees it crucial that the conclusions of this section are 
held up, namely that either dualism or belief-only monism is true (Ridge 2018b, 21-22). 
 
Ridge does not offer much analysis of existing quasi-realist theories to support his 
conclusion, and indeed, the conclusion seems to be rather quick. While it is true that 
existing quasi-realist theories have focused on explaining binary belief in moral matters 
as expressions of state-of-minds distinct from representational beliefs and more akin to 
desires, focusing on the vocabulary of traditional epistemology does not, however, 
necessarily mean that quasi-realism cannot be squared with credence-only monism like 
the Lockean threshold theory. Indeed, even the Lockean theory makes use of the word 
“belief” in describing how we act, which should then be explained. Quasi-realism can, 
and should be able to, explain how these above-certitude-threshold states of mind guide 
our actions. Possibly the explanation relies on contingent plans on the things the certitude 
judgement rests, or some other similar theory, which takes into account the less-than-full 
confidence on the proposition on the table.  
 
Either way, considering the arguments in this section, the situation looks promising for 
quasi-realists. Treating credences as part of the content of belief, or as a separate thing 
from belief should enable expressivists and quasi-realists to use whatever explanation 
realists would like to use to account for certitude. The question still remains that if 
credences are not understood as part of the content of belief, as in Moss’s theory, what 





5.4 Functionalist Explanation of Belief and Credences 
 
As we saw in the last two sections, certitude defies neat explanations of what it actually 
is. In many cases, the best we can do is to propose how to theoretically track it, but not 
define it. While the betting disposition combined with the presupposition of agent 
maximising her expected utility might predict the behaviour, it does not yet explain what 
credences are. At least if not understood as part of the content of the belief. If we 
presuppose credence to be a separate entity from belief although linked to it, we should 
first to ask what belief is. While there are multiple explanations on the metaphysics of 
mental states like belief, the one explored here is functionalism. Functionalism has 
arguably been one of the dominant ones (see f.e. Levin 2018, section 6), and furthermore, 
it could be said to be most in line with the quasi-realist program. In fact, Simon Blackburn 
has even gone to suggest that quasi-realism would be better called “non-representational 
functionalism” (Blackburn 1998, 177). In light of these facts, it is relevant to flesh out 
what functionalism says about belief in general and credence in particular.  
 
What is functionalism? Functionalism is a theory about states of mind, which says that 
belief is defined by its functional property. Specifically, it would be the three different 
factors or roles it has on the cognitive system: the way it is generated, the way it interacts 
with other cognitive states and the way it affects behaviour (Blackburn 1998, 56). The 
functional understanding of belief is thus stating (extreme simplified) that a belief “ it is 
raining outside” can be caused by sensory stimuli in the eye, has a relation to the desire 
not to get wet, and can produce the action of taking an umbrella with you when going out. 
The functional explanation did not reference any particular neural states or internal 
structure of the belief and is indeed commonly thought to be multiply realisable in that 
regard (Levin 2018, section 1). What functionalism offers is an explanation of a state of 
mind without any reference on the biological or physical happenings on the brain, and 
does not identify states of mind, like a belief, to a specific neural state. In other words, it 
is not a reduction to the biological reality.  
 
There can be at least two possible accounts on how a functionalist can explains credences. 
One possibility is for credence on a particular proposition to be understood as a separate 
state of mind from belief. In this case it would have its own functionalist explanation. A 
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credence of “it will rain tomorrow” is the relevant state that fills out the needed (multiply 
realizable) function. Namely that it satisfies the conditions laid out earlier in section 5.2:  
 
COMMON-SENSE CERTITUDE: It is the thing that should obey the probability 
calculus (and thus provides an interpretation of it), that is often but not always measured 
by betting dispositions, that guides decision, that underpins relations of confirmation 
between evidence and hypotheses, that is often revealed in verbal reports, and so on.  
 
As Ridge states, this type of account is fully compatible with quasi-realism (Ridge 2018, 
14). Whatever a realist wants to say about credences should be usable for quasi-realists 
as well, or at least there is not any apparent reason why they could not do so. Even better, 
as credences represent internal thinking and are subjective, it can be feasible asserted that 
they are expressed in the ordinary discourse much like expressivists say moral beliefs are 
expressed. We can thus be easily expressivists on credences. This amounts to claiming 
that credences are significantly different from representational beliefs, but suitably 
similar to moral belief and so capable of expressivistic treatment. 
 
The other option to explain credences is to understand them as part of a belief. If credence 
is not a separate state of mind, but rather a part of a belief, it should also be part of the 
functionalist account of belief. Namely, one of the functions of a belief is then to account 
for degrees. If so, it should be complementary to the other two functional conditions: how 
belief interacts with other cognitive states and how it affects behaviour. Just based on 
COMMON SENSE CERTITUDE, a certitude of a belief can change other beliefs, can be 
a factor of whether a belief is formed, and most certainly contributes to actions taken 
based on that belief.  
 
Interpreting credences as a functional requirement of a belief is in line with the original 
setup of Smith’s challenge explained in section 4.1: it is not something different from the 
belief itself but forms an integral part of the belief. Connecting credences to both 
interactions with other cognitive states allows variations on how a belief affects other 
cognitive states like desires and other beliefs. A belief with a low credence might lessen 
the credence of another belief and thus result in a desire to find out more about either of 
those beliefs. The behavioural factor is obviously the most discussed one. The behaviour 
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effect is, in a way, the whole betting interpretation that was laid out in section 5.1; the 
amount of credence affects the way the agent behaves, as he is acting for maximising 
expected utility.   
 
What about the potential problems if credences are understood in this way? If credence 
is part of the functional structure of belief, it means that a belief is necessary in order to 
have a credence on a proposition. That can be problematic. Just by reflection, it seems 
that we can assess the credibility of a proposition without having a belief on the 
proposition itself, so no belief is needed to have credences. Another problem would be to 
explain low credences. A belief with low credence does not seem to be what we 
understand a belief to be. To be counted as a belief, a certain amount of credibility seems 
to be required. As discussed in Ross and Schroeder (2014), belief is understood as a 
practical commitment to the truth of the proposition, which by definition needs more than 
low credence on the proposition. From this point of view the original question-setting by 
Smith is problematic. Credences should be understood as separate entities from belief. 
 
In summary, functionalism explains belief as a state of mind by the functional properties 
it has. Considering the problems encountered by adding credence as one of the functional 
properties of belief, it looks like it is better suited to be a separate state-of-mind. In this 
way, Smith’s original problem statement looks decisively faulty, as it seems to attach 
credence fully to the state-of-mind that is belief. If credences are understood as a separate 
state of mind from beliefs, whatever the details about the functional account ends up 
being, quasi-realists should be able to use the same account as the realist. Looking back 
how Simon Blackburn originally defined uncertainty, it was to be open to a possibility 
that when examining your belief from the viewpoint of your other judgements and beliefs 
it might be changed (Blackburn 1998, 318). If credences on our beliefs are different 
entities from beliefs themselves rather than a function or part of the content, then 
Blackburn’s view could be a viable starting point for mapping the needed functionalist 
explanation of credence. Namely that credences are created by the examination of belief, 
they stand in relation to all the beliefs used in examining the one credence points at, and 
they affect behaviour in potentially changing the acts one does based on the belief 
examined. While this is just a crude start of an explanation, it shows that there is at the 
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very least a promising potential for quasi-realists to provide a viable functionalist 






6 WE ARE ALL SMUG 
 
6.1 Stability and Credences Explained 
 
As was proposed by Andy Egan and gone through in section 3.1, expressivists should be 
able to explain how they can doubt the moral beliefs they have, even those that they judge 
to be stable. It turned out that what a stable belief really is was not all that clear. It was 
suggested that stability should be understood to be linked to credence of a belief, and so 
understanding credences is critical to answer Egan’s argument. Last two chapters 
investigated how credences are understood and what problems there are for expressivists 
in accounting them. It turned out that expressivists were not the only ones having 
problems with credences, as no consensus of how credences should be understood has 
been achieved. This result was significant in answering Michael Smith’s challenge to 
expressivism. As told in section 4.1, Smith argued that expressivists cannot accommodate 
all three features of a moral belief, namely importance, stability, and credence. Smith’s 
argument turned out to be too optimistic about realists’ resources on the same issue.  
 
Answering Smith, or at least defusing his problem, plays a key role in understanding how 
Egan’s problem can be addressed. The key to answer Egan is to understand the relation 
between traditional epistemological dualism and the Bayesian graded degrees of belief. 
This is because the literature on expressivism has been mostly dealing with traditional 
epistemological concepts, as Ridge (2018b) identified, while Egan’s problem statement 
should be understood as one dealing with modalities and beliefs with various amount of 
certitude. Previous chapter identified three different possibilities for linking these two 
together, and luckily for quasi-realists, the best options are available for expressivists, 
contrary to what Smith supposed. This chapter will converge the findings of previous 
chapters in order to propose a solution to the problem Egan posed for quasi-realists. This 
first section will explore what the previous discussions affect how stability and doubt 
should be understood, and the section after this one will then propose a solution to Egan’s 
challenge. 
 
As explained in chapter 4, Egan accused quasi-realists of smugness by saying that they 




FIRST-PERSON IMMUNITY: I have an a priori guarantee against fundamental moral 
error (Egan 2007, 214). 
 
First-person immunity arose because quasi-realists defined doubt as: 
 
QUASI-REALIST UNCERTAINTY: Being uncertain of one’s own moral belief is to be 
open to a possibility that the belief might not survive an improvement in one’s epistemic 
situation. 
 
This formulation of uncertainty cannot target a stable belief, where stability is defined as 
one that the believer would not abandon even after an improvement in their moral 
sensibility, where the improvement is one that the believer would endorse (Egan 2007, 
212). Egan’s formulation of the problem was shown by Simon Blackburn (2009) to be 
problematic, as Egan seemed to say that quasi-realists would need to equate stability 
judgements with truth. Quasi-realists and expressivists are not in the business of 
providing definitions of truth or falsehood, so this charge does not hold. However, 
Sebastian Köhler later on modified Egan’s argument and challenged expressivists to show 
how this belief can be doubted, if doubting own moral beliefs is to be open to a possibility 
that those beliefs can be changed (Köhler 2015, 163). 
 
Not being able to answer Köhler would, in effect, end quasi-realists in the same 
conclusion Egan came to. While I do not equate stability with truth, if I cannot sensibly 
doubt stable beliefs, I must claim those beliefs to be true. In section 3.3 it was shown how 
Michael Ridge (2015) eventually connected stability to credences. His idea was that in its 
extreme form stability would need to be connected to credences: judging a belief stable 
would require giving it significantly higher credence than its negation, and no 
improvements that the believer's epistemic standards would allow could overturn this 
state of affairs (Ridge 2015, 17). As we saw in section 3.3, this formulation of the stability 
did not allow Ridge to dodge the bullet, and he was still forced to acknowledge that an 




When considering how Michael Smith labelled the three features of moral judgements 
and comparing those to the stability as discussed by Egan and others, something 
interesting emerges. Smith (2002, 308) defined robustness of a belief as the stability of 
that belief’s credences, whereas Egan (2007, 212) defined fundamental belief as a stable 
belief which could not be overturned, no matter what changes in our knowledge or 
understanding of the issue.5 It is clear that Egan’s formulation of a stable belief must be 
one that is fully robust in Smith’s terms. After all, robustness means resistance to change 
the certitude. But it is not clear what credences a stable belief should have. Either a stable 
belief is fully robust and its certitude can be less than 1, or the belief is fully robust and 
has full certitude. The level of certainty in a stable belief is not clear, only that it cannot 
be changed. Michael Ridge argued for the former, and I will argue for the latter. This 
argument will lay groundwork for discussion in the next section.  
 
Ridge argued that for the credibility of his solution, he must allow for credence to be less 
than 1, i.e. he must allow fundamental stable beliefs to be less than absolutely certain 
(Ridge 2015, 13). The argument is that otherwise radical epistemological scepticism, like 
the one that the Matrix-movies introduced to the general public at the beginning of this 
millennia, would only allow beliefs about logical truths and mathematical equations to be 
fundamental. Ridge also explains Egan’s challenge in modal terms and explains a stable 
judgement as one expressed by “must” (Ridge 2015, 6). Ridge notes that ordinary 
speakers use “must be true” about some propositions even if they are not willing to give 
those propositions the same level of certainty as logical and mathematical truths (Ridge 
2015, 13). An example of that kind of a proposition would be to say “he must be winning 
this race; he is so much ahead of the competition” about a runner in a marathon. Statement 
like this can be said without being absolutely certain that the runner is winning the race. 
Moreover, these “must” statements are really ubiquitous, so Ridge is not willing to say 
that these speakers are either confused, do not really mean what they say or are speaking 
loosely (Ridge 2015, 13). Thus he needs to understand “must”, and consequently 
 
5 Köhler’s or Ridge’s more accurate characterisation of stability does not fundamentally change 
Egan’s original idea. Namely that a stable belief is one that will not change under any 
improvement. Köhler and Ridge just formulated this in a way that understood this as the content 
of a different judgement, the judgement that a belief is stable in this way. 
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fundamental stable beliefs, as ones encroached only in terms of contextually sensitive 
“much higher credence”.  
 
Attentive reader sees echoes of previous discussion here. In section 5.3 there were 
discussions about how full belief and Bayesian probabilistic content are related, and one 
of the theories discussed and rejected was the Lockean thesis, which understands “belief” 
to be a credence above some threshold t. Ridge’s explanation looks surprisingly similar: 
to be counted as a stable belief using “must”, it must have a credence above some 
contextually determined threshold t2. To understand a belief as requiring contextually 
determined, but necessary, credence had a lot of unfortunate side-effects. For one 
allowing “x must be true” to have less than full credence creates opportunities to deny 
that we are ever wrong (Ross & Schoeder 2014, 275). If I shout out loud that “x must be 
true!”, dismiss anyone saying otherwise, and it turns out that x was not, in fact, true, I can 
say that I took no stand. I just assigned x a contextually high enough possibility while 
also giving its negation a positive possibility; in this way I would not be wrong as such. 
 
The alternative solutions identified in section 5.3 proposed to understand most beliefs as 
a heuristic commitment to the truth of a proposition (Ross & Schoeder 2014, 286). 
Moreover, while having the belief commits one to treat a proposition as true, this 
commitment is defeasible, which means it has less than full credence (Ross & Schoeder 
2014, 267). Could we use the same tactic to describe “must be true” as well? No, as that 
would be to be entirely minimalistic about the term “must”. If “x must be true” would be 
the same thing as committing to treating x as true, there would be nothing to separate “x 
must be true” and “x”. To be clear, in many cases we do seem to act like this is the case, 
but it is problematic in the specific case Egan set up. Egan’s argument calls for 
fundamental and stable beliefs, which cannot be changed by the believer by any positive 
change which the believer would endorse. Fundamental and stable beliefs cannot be 
merely pragmatic commitments to truth and so be defeasible in a suitable situation, as 
Ross and Schroeder explain their pragmatic commitment to be. 
 
What the reasoning disposition account explains is how we can act according to beliefs 
we do not regard as certain. We act as those beliefs are true, until a high cost might be the 
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result of the action (Ross & Schroeder 2014, 267). High stakes make us question our 
beliefs and act more cautiously. Saying “that runner must be winning the game” can be 
an expression of a disposition to treat “runner x will win the game” as true as long as there 
is no high cost associated with that belief. The “must” would be abandoned if a bet for all 
future net income would be required to utter it. What this shows is that in many cases we 
say “must be true”, but actually mean “must be likely”. As already argued, this does not 
seem to be good enough to capture a belief that the believer judges to be so robust that no 
positive change would make her drop that belief.  
 
Similar story can be told with the terminology introduced by Sarah Moss. Moss, as we 
recall from section 5.3, ditched credences as separate states of mind and instead argued 
that they are part of the content of a belief. Having a 0.2 credence on “it is going to rain 
tomorrow” is actually believing “it is 0.2 probable that it is going to rain tomorrow”. Moss 
also argued that we use sentences in both strict and loose sense. Saying that “it is three 
o’clock” might mean any time close enough to three o’clock when the content is “loose”, 
whereas if the content is “strict” it would mean exactly three o’clock (Moss 2018, 60). If 
credences are part of the content of the belief, then the same terminology can be used to 
explain how belief and certainty differ from each other. We might have a belief with loose 
probabilistic content where we communicate, for practical reasons, something which 
seems true without having 100% confidence in it.  We are, in effect, speaking loosely 
about possibilities and certainties. Speaking loosely about “certainty” and “must” is equal 
to Ross and Schroeder’s disposition to treat a proposition as true. To contrast this, to have 
full certainty on something is to have a belief with strict probabilistic content, where we 
are actually certain of something (Moss 2018, 60).  
 
What does this all amount to, and why does it matter?  The previous discussion point into 
a direction where a fundamental and stable belief truly has full credence, no matter if it 
is understood as a separate state of mind or content as a set of probability spaces. To have 
full certainty that “x is true” is also to judge that our belief is fully robust. Why is this so? 
Moss’s probabilistic content illustrates this best. If a full certainty on a belief means 
having as a content a set of probability spaces where no matter what, the proposition is 
always true, an agent cannot believe that she would change her belief in the future. If she 
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would believe that, there would exist a possible world in her set of probability spaces 
where the proposition is not true. To be clear, what we are dealing with here is subjective 
confidence of the truth of a proposition, not facts as such. So even if the agent judges her 
belief true and judges it fully robust, she could in fact be wrong and somehow learn the 
truth the very next minute and thus change her mind. For the argument in question, it does 
not matter. What we are interested in is that at that moment, she believes that she would 
not change her mind in any possible positive case. 
 
To recap, full robustness and full certitude go hand-in-hand. Believing that you have a 
fully robust belief has to include a belief about it having a full certitude as well. 
Otherwise, the possibility of changing it in the future is not ruled out. Also, to have a full 
certitude on a belief means having a belief about its full robustness. Leaving the option 
open to change the belief in future is not to have full certainty on its truth. The two beliefs 
necessarily accompany each other, giving a hint of how to answer Köhler’s formulation 
of Egan’s challenge. In the next section, both Köhler and Egan are answered by explaining 
why our stable beliefs cannot be doubted by anyone. As explained in chapter 3, 
expressivists have previously argued that doubting our stable beliefs is either impossible, 
or that failure to do so is not smug. What those explanations have lacked is, however, a 
clear reason of why this is so. Clearly a judgement of stability is not the same as a 
judgement of truthiness, and that should make doubting possible. As for the statement 
that no smugness is involved in this failure of doubting our own stable judgements or 
beliefs, that has been argued to be either lacking or questionably seen to belong to 
metaethical commitments, not to ordinary moral thought. The next section will argue that 
it is indeed impossible to doubt beliefs we have judged stable, and that this failure is 
indeed smug. However, this smugness is not only a feature of expressivism, but of all 
human thought regardless of any metaethical inclinations. 
 
6.2 Why Stable Beliefs Cannot Be Doubted by Anyone 
 
In section 3.2, Andy Egan’s argument about smug quasi-realists found its clarified form. 
Instead of needing to define how true or false should be understood, the real challenge 
for quasi-realists is to explain the states-of-mind involved when an agent doubts her own 
belief, which she is also judging to be stable. The question is not about what makes claims 
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stable, fundamental, or error-free, but what happens in the agent’s mind when she makes 
these stability judgements. As Köhler (2015) described the case, when doubting a moral 
belief J, the agent is judging that the moral sensibility which produced J might be at fault. 
From the agent’s perspective, that would be a complex state-of-mind featuring two 
judgements: 
 
(1) A judgement that any sensibility S(x) is better than any other sensibility S(y), if 
S(x) has certain features F(1), F(2),...., or F(x) which S(y) lacks. 
 
(2) A judgment that there might be (at least) one feature F(x), which is such that my 
sensibility S(z) lacks it and such that, if my sensibility changed so that it had F(x), 
I would abandon belief J. 
 
This formulation does not include any reference to credences, but as was argued earlier, 
credences are essential for defining certainty and uncertainty. Adding credences to 
judgement (2) would make it: 
 
(2b) A judgement with positive credence that there exists (at least) one feature F(x), 
which is such that my sensibility S(z) lacks it and such that, if my sensibility 
changed so that it had F(x), I would abandon belief J. 
 
Doubting can be elaborated even more clearly when we add a claim about robustness in 
the judgement, as previous section argued should be done: 
 
(2c) A judgement with positive credence that belief J is not fully robust, as there 
exists (at least) one feature F(x), which is such that my sensibility S(z) lacks it and 
such that, if my sensibility changed so that it had F(x), I would abandon belief J. 
 
Now we can see that we end up with the same result that Köhler ended up in section 3.2. 
The enhanced formulation will only make it clearer that (2c) cannot co-exists with a 
judgment that belief J is fully robust. But contrary to Köhler’s original formulation, 




As explored in chapter 5, credences or degrees of belief are not betting behaviour, but in 
some circumstances, a credence determines what bets would be acceptable. To 
understand what credences are and how they should be understood, chapter 5 investigated 
the relationship between the graded degree of belief and the traditional epistemological 
binary understanding of beliefs. To understand what Egan’s fundamental stable beliefs 
are, it is crucial to establish the relationship between belief and full credence. Especially 
as just saying that belief should be understood as equivalent to full credence would require 
significant changes to our normal understanding of what a belief is. We do seem to have 
less than fully certain beliefs.  
 
There were two possible options described to mitigate this worry. Either credences and 
beliefs are separate state of minds, where something to be counted as a belief needs just 
the practical commitment of treating it as true in our reasoning, as argued by Ross and 
Schroeder (2014), or as Moss (2018) argued, that a credence is actually part of the content 
of a belief and is represented by a set of possibility spaces. Both options leave it open for 
a full credence to be something really rare: a full commitment to the truth of the 
proposition in question. In other words, having full credence on the truth of a proposition 
is to claim that we know it, thus claiming to have knowledge. The judgement of 
knowledge is markedly different from the judgement of stability. For one, to claim 
knowledge is a judgement about the objective world, while judgements of stability are 
about the subjective mind. 
 
As argued in the last section, fundamental and stable belief should be understood as a 
belief with a full credence. Judging our belief stable necessarily means that we believe 
that we have knowledge: we (think we) know that the belief is true. It does not mean that 
a claim about stability is a claim about knowledge, these are two different things. Instead, 
the two are necessarily linked. To claim that you know something to be true is to claim 
that that belief is stable, and to judge that your belief is stable is to believe that you know 
that it is a true claim. Claiming knowledge and stability judgement necessarily correlate 
but do not necessarily cause each other. As we all know, correlation is not causation. 
 
It is quite easy to see why this would be so. The sensibility which produces beliefs is the 
same we use for evaluating epistemic qualities. The epistemic perspective that forms the 
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basis of evaluating truthfulness, and either allows or denies forming of hypothesis, both 
produces credences for beliefs and evaluates if they are true. To be clear, this does not 
mean that anyone should claim knowledge because their belief is stable. It just is that 
these two things necessarily correlate as the same epistemic sensibility produce both of 
them based on same known facts. 
 
Doubting things which you declare as knowledge does not seem to be coherent. “I know 
that x, but it might not be x” does not look too good of a judgement. While there still 
exists the same asymmetry that Egan noticed between our beliefs and everyone else’s 
beliefs, suddenly it does not look problematic. If we know that “killing people just for 
own pleasure is wrong” we will say that anyone who does not agree is wrong. That might 
be smug, but as long as we truly can say that we know that, we simply cannot allow that 
anyone disagreeing could be right. That is a psychological restriction and it might be that 
someone can persuade me otherwise, and thus, we can conclude that we did not actually 
know that. But at the moment of declaring something as a piece of knowledge, we 
automatically discredit any other options. Is this smug? Maybe, but it rather looks like we 
cannot help ourselves. Turns out that Andy Egan did find out a real feature of quasi-
realism. Quasi-realists cannot doubt their own beliefs they judge as stable. But neither 
can anyone else. However, quasi-realists can also explain why this is so: states of minds 
expressed by judging our own belief stable and doubting that same belief are in conflict. 
Providing an explanation to this phenomena should not be seen as a fault, but as a benefit 





This thesis has explored how uncertainty in moral beliefs should be understood from 
quasi-realist perspective. As there has been arguments against quasi-realism that it, in 
fact, cannot do this, investigating those has formed the backbone of the thesis. Andy Egan 
accused quasi-realists for being smug about their fundamental moral beliefs as those 
could not leave any room for uncertainty in a quasi-realist narrative. Even worse, Michael 
Smith has accused of expressivists, which quasi-realists are, of not even being capable of 
accounting for uncertainty in any moral belief. In this thesis I have argued that both 
arguments are wrong, and that quasi-realists do not face any additional burden of proof 
in these matters.  
 
To understand why Andy Egan’s accusation of smugness against quasi-realism misses its 
mark it is important to understand what needs to be explained. Egan supposed that quasi-
realists would be in a unique situation where they would need go against common moral 
thought and claim to know a priori that any of their stable moral beliefs would be true, 
while no one else’s stable moral beliefs would enjoy such assurances. To dissolve this 
accusation, it needs to be shown either that no such a priori knowledge exist, or that this 
does not go against our surface-level moralizing. Egan’s focus on the a priori truthfulness 
turned out to be flawed, but the problem persisted. The problem was actually about the 
impossibility for an expressivist to entertain ideas of stability and uncertainty about one 
and the same moral belief. Not being able to doubt a belief based on just the fact that one 
is not going to change it after any positive change is just as smug as a priori certainty that 
one is correct. To defuse the charge of smugness quasi-realist needs to either reformulate 
what uncertainty means or explain why we cannot doubt our stable beliefs. 
 
In this thesis I have argued that the latter project should be the aim of quasi-realists. 
Indeed, the correct route would be to say that we all are smug about all of our stable 
beliefs, and not just moral beliefs. While similar argument has been made by many 
expressivists, reasons for this has been left somewhat unclear. In this thesis I aimed to 
explain why smugness arises from judgements of stability by investigating how stability, 
robustness, and credence are connected. I argued that only beliefs with a full credence 
could be declared stable, and at the same time, declaring a belief as stable is to claim 
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knowledge about the issue. A judgement of stability inevitably means a belief of 
knowledge, as both arise from the same roots. Doubting something you declare you know 
is not coherent, which explains why no one can coherently think that their belief is stable 
and that it could be erroneous, at least at the same time. 
 
For the previous argument to work, relying on credences must be available for 
expressivists. Having credences available requires answering Michael Smith’s argument. 
Chapter 5 of thesis argued that credences are not well explained by anyone, and that the 
standard description of betting behaviour is especially not suitable for describing moral 
uncertainty. While Krister Bykvist and Jonas Olson have done commendable job in 
pointing out all the ways that expressivists have failed in explaining credences, the 
situation is not much better for anyone else. No one has been able to offer any clear 
arguments why realists would be in any better position when it comes to explaining what 
credences are and how they should be understood. Based on the discussion in the section 
5.3, of the three possible ways a credence is linked to a belief: either belief is reducible 
to a credence, belief and a credence co-exist side-by-side, or that a credence is part of the 
content of belief. Only the first one poses any trouble for expressivists. Luckily for 
expressivists, the first option also looks like the least probable one. If credences cannot 
be reduced to beliefs, expressivists should be able to use any explanation of credences 
that realists can use.  
 
All problems solved? Not quite. There are a lot of open questions still in the air. While 
the move to claim to use whatever explanation realists will use in order to explain 
credences is in all probability the correct one, as a solution it is not the most elegant one. 
We would all benefit from a good explanation of what credences are. Especially as, 
despite Bykvist and Olson’s insistence that we should be able to compare our confidence-
level of descriptive and moral beliefs, there does seem to be something different about 
the two. Comparing “grass is probably green on the next side of this building” and “theft 
is most definitely wrong” are not necessarily intuitively comparable. This incomparability 
should not be thought to be a problem just for expressivists. Indeed, expressivists might 
be in a better position to explain differences between moral and descriptive beliefs like 




There is also a concern about how to modify expressivist and quasi-realist theories to 
speak of credences. While this thesis has argued that there is no obstacle for including 
credences to an expressivist theory, no current theory explicitly speaks of certitude, 
preferring to talk only in the language of binary-belief (Ridge 2018, 21). While focusing 
just on practical dispositions to count a proposition as true or similar heuristics will give 
a story about almost all of our moral talk, a significant portion will be left out. Luckily, 
if the arguments made in this thesis are correct, all the tools for providing the explanation 
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